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Passed on the eve of Medicaid's fiftieth anniversary, the Achieving a
Better Live Experience (ABLE) Act was a hard-fought victory for
individuals with significant disabilities and their families. The law,
which creates a new form of tax-preferred savings account, represents
an invaluable work-around for highly restrictive Medicaid eligibility
requirements. Medicaid eligibility is crucially important for
individuals with intellectual, developmental, and other significant
disabilities because it provides nearly exclusive access to government-
coordinated habilitative care, such as in-home assistance, job
supports, and adaptive equipment. These services are necessary to
maintain a base-level quality of lfe, facilitate independent living, and
preserve the dignity of individuals with disabilities. Despite their
importance, they are difflicult to purchase and coordinate in the
private market, and due to income and asset holding restrictions on
eligibility, only the very poor can access them through Medicaid, even
after passage of the Affordable Care Act. This Article argues that
despite their facial neutrality, income and asset holding restrictions,
commonly referred to as means testing, result in undue hardship when
they are applied to the provision of government-coordinated
habilitative care for individuals with significant disabilities.
Congress's attempts to mitigate this hardship, including the recently
passed ABLE Act, are important steps forward, but they also can
impose economic, dignitary, and emotional harms on individuals with
disabilities.
Based on the distinctive needs of individuals with significant
disabilities, this Article takes the counterintuitive position that these
individuals should be afforded access to government-coordinated
habilitative care through Medicaid without regard to income or
wealth. Under current market conditions, non-means-tested access to
habilitative care is a normatively superior solution because it
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preserves the autonomy and dignity of individuals with disabilities and
may be simultaneously cost-neutral and utility-increasing. Granting
unrestricted access to government-coordinated habilitative care to
individuals with significant disabilities would eliminate perverse
employment and financial planning incentives created by Congress's
past attempts to broaden access. Finally, it would create parity among
parents who plan for the future of children with disabilities and those
whose children are typically-abled, as well as parity for retirement
savings among workers with significant disabilities and those without.
As a result, Congress should revisit and revise means-tested access to
disability-related services through Medicaid.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Thomas, a healthy and beautiful baby boy, was born in 2015 into an
upper-middle class family. Within months of his birth, and with the assistance
of a highly specialized attorney, his parents drafted a trust that, in the event of
their deaths, would prevent him from ever using family resources to pay for
food, shelter, or other necessary expenses. Next, the parents contacted their
insurers, their employers, and their investment advisors to make sure that, in
the event of their deaths, Baby Thomas would receive no life insurance
proceeds and no payments from their retirement accounts. These, too, were
given to the trust. Thomas's parents did everything in their power to make sure
that when he reached adulthood, Thomas would be penniless and forced to
rely on government assistance for his entire adult life. They even included
language in the trust providing that any expense covered by a government
program could not be covered by the trust. In other words, because Thomas
would qualify for government-assisted housing, the trust could not help him
with rent. Because the government would provide food assistance, the trust
could not help Thomas with groceries. The trustee was expressly forbidden
from making support payments to Thomas, and the trust document gave
absolute discretion to the trustee, who could choose to make no payments at
all. Stranger still, Thomas's legal impoverishment and his future reliance on
public assistance are encouraged by federal law.
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Why would Thomas's parents be so perverse, and why would federal law
sanction their behavior? The answer is that he was bom with Down Syndrome.
Because of his disability, it is likely that Thomas will need assistance, usually
referred to as "habilitative" care, to live and work in a community setting.'
Habilitative care typically includes aids to daily living such as personal care,
homemaking, transportation, and adult day care. 2 It also covers case
management by a social worker and, for individuals who have a regular
caretaker, respite care to provide the caretaker with a break.3 Habilitative care
is crucial, particularly to individuals with intellectual and developmental
disabilities. One study indicated that over 60% of these individuals need help
with bathing, eating meals, and taking medications.4 Over 70% of them need
help with finances and home maintenance, and over 80% of them need help
using transportation.5 Although family members currently provide much of the
habilitative care needed by individuals with disabilities, they cannot be
omnipresent. 6 Siblings have careers and families; parents age and die.
Furthermore, habilitative services can be difficult to purchase and coordinate
in the private market.7 For many, government-coordinated care is absolutely
essential to maintain quality of life.
1 See Life After High School, NAT'L DowN SYNDROME SOC'Y (NDSS) [hereinafter
NDSS], http://www.ndss.org/Resources/Transition-and-Beyond/Life-After-High-School/
[http://perma.cc/Z6L8-KDWT] (describing supports needed to transition adults with Down
Syndrome from high school into adult living).
2 Id
3I
4 THE ARC, STILL IN THE SHADOWS WITH THEIR FUTURE UNCERTAIN: A REPORT ON
FAMILY AND INDIVIDUAL NEEDS FOR DISABILITY SUPPORTS (FINDS) 6 (June 2011),
http://www.thearc.org/document.doc?id=3672 [http://perma.cc/7MML-BS5B].
5 Id
6 1d. ("Parents, siblings and family members struggle mightily so that their family
member with I/DD can continue to live at home, or independently, and have a typical life.
The majority of families report that they provide personal care. . . ."); Sheryl Larson et al.,
Characteristics of and Service Use by Persons with MR/DD Living in Their Own Homes or
with Family Members: NHIS-D Analysis, MR/DD DATA BRIEF (Research and Training
Center on Community Living & Institute on Community Living (UAP), Minneapolis,
Minn.), Apr. 2001, at 11, http://rtc.umn.edu/docs/dddb3-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/TX8A-
XVLG] (finding that while only 20% of adults in the general population live with relatives,
among those with intellectual or developmental disabilities 60% do).
7 See THE ARC, supra note 4, at 7-8 (finding that more than 75% of families report
that they cannot find reliable care providers, and 80% report that they do not have enough
money to pay for care that their family member with a disability needs); THE KAISER
COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 10 (Mar. 2013)
[hereinafter MEDICAID PRIMER], https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/
2010/06/7334-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9UB-YZHC] (reporting that individuals with
disabilities often are unable to obtain adequate private coverage, and Medicaid allows them
to obtain services needed to live and work in the community); see also Yael Zakai Cannon,
There's No Place Like Home: Realizing the Vision of Community-Based Mental Health
Treatment for Children, 61 DEPAUL L. REv. 1049, 1063 (attributing the limited access to
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This Article is the first to address the newly enacted Achieving a Better
Life Experience Act (the ABLE Act).8 The ABLE Act partially addresses
outdated legal restrictions on access to government-provided habilitative care.9
Although it is a clear victory and a major improvement in financial planning
for the disability community, its solution is incomplete. As we mark the
fiftieth anniversary of Medicaid,' 0 the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)," and the fifteenth anniversary of the
Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead v. L.C.,1 2 there still exists no
comprehensive means of safeguarding the quality of life of individuals like
Thomas. Under the ADA, employers are not required to make
accommodations for personal needs of daily living, such as hygiene, nutrition,
and transportation, without which employment and community living are
impossible.1 3 Instead, this responsibility falls to the states, which must provide
care to individuals with developmental disabilities "in the most integrated
setting appropriate."' 4 The Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead requires
states to provide support for community living when "the State's treatment
professionals determine that such placement is appropriate, the affected
persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably
accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the State and the
needs of others with mental disabilities."' 5 Indeed, a series of sweeping
consent decrees has brought to light the power of Olmstead by requiring states
to provide an unprecedented level of job and personal support to individuals
with serious disabilities who are living in community with their typically-abled
peers.16
mental health care for children to the "frequent failure of private insurance" and lack of
adequate government-provided resources).
8 Stephen Beck, Jr., Achieving a Better Life Experience Act of 2014, Pub. L. No.
113-295, 128 Stat. 4056 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 529A, 3511, 7705 (West Supp. 2015))
[hereinafter ABLE Act of 2014].
9 The purpose of the new law is to "assist individuals and families in saving private
funds for the purpose of supporting individuals with disabilities [and t] o provide secure
funding for disability-related expenses . .. that will supplement, but not supplant, benefits
provided" through Medicaid and other government programs. ABLE Act of 2014, § 101,
128 Stat. at 4056.
10Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 286,
343-52 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a-b, 1396c-d (2012)).
1 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012)).
12 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
13See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future ofDisability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 25-26 &
nn.95-101 (2004).
1428 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2015); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (codification of
ADA Title II).
15 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607.
16 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Div., DOJ Olmstead Enforcement by Circuit
Court, ADA.GOV, [hereinafter Olmstead Enforcement], http://www.ada.gov/
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Olmstead's new breadth is not enough. States provide some or all of the
Olmstead mandates through Medicaid, and Medicaid is not universally
available to individuals with serious disabilities. Instead, its reach is limited to
those who live with very limited means. Income and asset limitations that bar
access to Medicaid are impactful because states rely on Medicaid to provide
Olmstead- and ADA-related services such as personal care and special job
assistance, even when those services are not medical in nature.17 As a result,
even the most sweeping consent decree or court decision under Olmstead may
fail to provide greater access to disability-related services to individuals who
are not Medicaid-eligible.
Because it dictates access not only to medical care but also to necessary
disability-related social services, Medicaid eligibility is crucially important to
people with developmental disabilities, and through it, the government
coordinates and pays for many services that are either not supported by private
markets or that are cost-prohibitive.' 8 Means testing, which is the limitation of
Medicaid eligibility to individuals at low levels of income and asset holdings,
creates a bar to access for individuals with disabilities. As a result, typically
only those individuals who qualify for other forms of public assistance, such
as public housing and food stamps, can receive such services through
Medicaid.1 9 Those who have savings, who receive an inheritance from a
family member, or who earn a living wage are ineligible, even though
habilitative services may be critical to continued employment and life
satisfaction.20 For these people, securing access to Medicaid's disability-
related services requires careful financial planning and limitations on
employment. In light of these facts, the motivation of Thomas's parents
becomes clear. In order to ensure his future access to habilitative services,
Thomas's parents must turn him into a welfare claimant. Their seemingly
bizarre choice preserves his access to disability-related social services that will
enable him to avoid institutionalization when his parents can no longer care for
him.21
olmstead/olmsteadenforcement.htm [http://perma.cc/2Z7T-8SHX] (describing court cases
and consent decrees under Olmstead).17 See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 26 (noting that society's response to disability
historically has been "heavily medicalized" and that personal assistance and adaptive
technology "are typically regarded as 'medical' services for which the health insurance
system is responsible").
18Id. at 27-28 ("[P]rivate insurance-on which most nondisabled people rely for their
health needs-fails to cover the services people with disabilities most need for
independence and health.").
19See infra Part III.D.
2 0 See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 27 ("[P]ublic insurance is saddled with
requirements that lock people with disabilities out of the workforce.").
21 Under 42 U.S.C § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2012), assets in a federally sanctioned special
needs trust are not counted as Thomas's assets for purposes of determining supplemental
security income (SSI) or Medicaid eligibility.
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As Thomas's example demonstrates, Medicaid eligibility rules create
perverse incentives .when applied to disability-related services that are cost-
prohibitive or not readily available through private markets. Individuals with
disabilities are incentivized to choose low-wage, volunteer, and part-time
positions in order to preserve access to habilitative services. Furthermore,
families like Thomas's must preemptively choose government dependency for
their children, even when families would prefer to help with necessities like
rent, groceries, utilities, or private medical insurance.
In an attempt to address perverse incentives created by Medicaid eligibility
rules, Congress passed the ABLE Act in late December of 2014.22 This Article
is the first to address the new legislation. Like the Olmstead consent decrees,
the ABLE Act is both a vitally important lifeline and an insufficient one. It
will allow individuals with significant disabilities and their families to save
money for necessities without affecting Medicaid eligibility. But legislative
compromises have limited its effectiveness. Contributions to savings are
capped at a low amount that bears no relation to the magnitude of disability-
related expenses, and easy fixes that could have both preserved the fisc and
protected individuals with disabilities went unused.23 Legal impoverishment,
then, will remain a requirement for Medicaid eligibility for many people, and
it will continue to be accomplished through the use of a federally sanctioned
special needs trust like the one created for Thomas. These financial planning
instruments may simultaneously force adult beneficiaries with disabilities to
rely on public benefits such as housing, food assistance, and other entitlements
while limiting their employment opportunities, denying them autonomy of
decision-making, and interfering with natural family support relationships.
Access to Medicaid for individuals with significant disabilities must be
broadened. Prior attempts to remedy the problem have relied on the resources
and participation of private actors such as family members. These attempted
fixes are important because they preserve access. But at the same time, they
impose dignitary and financial costs on individuals with disabilities, their
families, the federal budget, and society as a whole. They also impose
distributional costs because not all individuals with disabilities have access to
private assistance. There is no compelling normative justification for the
imposition of these costs, and the law should be amended to reduce or
eliminate them. A public, rather than a private solution must be found.
Amendment must be done with a conscious regard for commonly accepted
goals, including freedom from paternalism, maximization of the autonomy of
individuals with disabilities and their family members, and integration of
22 See ABLE Act of 2014, Ptib. L. No. 113-295, 128 Stat. 4056 (codified at I.R.C.
§§ 529A. 3511. 7705 (West Supp. 2015)).2 3 I.R.C. § 529A(b) (limiting yearly contributions to the amount in effect under I.R.C.
§ 2503(b) ($14,000 in 2015), and aggregate contributions to the limitation in effect for the
relevant state's § 529 college savings accounts).
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individuals with disabilities into the community to the extent possible and
desired. 24
This Article takes a counterintuitive position. Individuals with significant
disabilities should be entitled to disability-related services and habilitative care
through Medicaid regardless of their level of income or wealth. This solution
is public rather than private; it does not rely on private actors for its
implementation. Broadening access to Medicaid in this way has the potential
to both increase tax revenue and reduce costs for state and federal government.
By removing poverty as a barrier to access, government can offer disability-
related services to a broader segment of the population, enabling more
individuals to enter the workforce. In addition, removing poverty as a barrier
to access will eliminate perverse financial planning incentives that currently
result in the artificial impoverishment of individuals with disabilities who then
rely on non-disability-related government programs such as food and housing
assistance.
In recognition of the political difficulty and potential distributional
concerns raised by the creation of a new entitlement, the Article offers a
second solution: the removal of means testing as a bar to government-
coordinated habilitative care coupled with an income and asset insensitive
Medicaid buy-in model for individuals at high levels of income or asset
holding. If the unique fact of disability is found insufficient to justify the
provision of habilitative care at no cost to the recipient, individuals with
disabilities who have access to large pools of resources could be asked to pay
either for inclusion in Medicaid and/or for government coordination of their
services. To entirely deny these individuals access to government-coordinated,
disability-related services, as the current law often does, makes little sense
from either a normative or pragmatic perspective if these services are difficult
to find or cost-prohibitive on the private market. 25 Furthermore, broadening
the constituency for government-coordinated, disability-related services is
likely to bring political pressure to bear that might result in better, higher
quality, or more varied services in the future.
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of federal attempts to foster
the integration of individuals with serious disabilities into the community. It
also explains why these attempts have been insufficient to address the
distinctive needs of those individuals. To date, the federal government has
24 See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 7-8 (noting consensus among "diverse disability
rights activists" on the subjects of paternalism and integration).
25 One objection may be that if Medicaid resources are scarce, entry of wealthier
individuals into the program will result in a shortage that will be detrimental to all
enrollees. This argument ignores the possibility that a new revenue stream would allow
Medicaid to expand its network of service providers. In addition, to the extent that
Medicaid is currently viewed as a program for the poor, there may be less political will to
improve or expand its disability-related services. Entry of individuals of higher
socioeconomic position into the system may raise its political visibility and result in better
or more services.
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focused primarily on preventing overt discrimination on the basis of disability.
There is, however, a growing recognition on the part of scholars and advocates
that individuals with intellectual or other serious disabilities often need not
only antidiscrimination measures but also specialized social support tailored to
their distinctive needs.26 Part II concludes by drawing upon this insight to set
normative goals for the revision of Medicaid eligibility guidelines that
determine access to government-coordinated habilitative care.
Part III describes the importance of a particular form of social support-
Medicaid-funded waiver services for the provision of government-coordinated
habilitative care-and describes laws that both mandate and restrict access to
those services. Waiver services, which allow individuals with intellectual
disabilities to live in the community rather than in an institution, are difficult
to purchase privately.27 Their provision is not, however, universally mandated
by the ADA. Rather, their availability is governed by state law and may be
severely restricted on the basis of a recipient's income and asset holdings. 28 As
a result, individuals with disabilities and their families are presented with
perverse incentives for minimization of work and saving as a means of
preserving access to disability-related services.
Part IV describes special needs trust planning, through which the federal
government and some states have provided a means to work around state
income and asset holding restrictions on Medicaid eligibility. This Part argues
that special needs trust planning, while important, is normatively inferior to
other solutions because it disproportionately burdens less wealthy or less
legally sophisticated families and imposes dignitary and emotional harms on
the trust beneficiary and the beneficiary's family. In addition, because it relies
on private actors for its implementation, special needs trust planning is not
available to all individuals with disabilities.
Part V describes the ABLE Act, a recent addition to the Internal Revenue
Code. The ABLE Act provides a second means of preservation of Medicaid
26 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 4 ("[T]he future of disability law lies as
much in social welfare law as in antidiscrimination law."); Ruth Colker, Anti-
Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1415, 1421-
22 (2007) (arguing that modem disability law should "leav[e] room for modem approaches
to the delivery of separate services and maintenance of some disability-only institutions");
Francine J. Lipman, Enabling Work for People with Disabilities: A Post-Integrationist
Revision of Underutilized Tax Incentives, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 393, 409 (2003) (calling for
more aggressive redistribution to individuals with disabilities); Theodore P. Seto & Sande
L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L.
REv. 1053, 1062 (2006) (noting that census data indicate that roughly half of all public
benefits claimants have a disability); Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A
Post-Integrationist Examination, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 889, 942-56 (proposing
amendments to welfare law affecting individuals with disabilities).
27 See THE ARC, supra note 4, at 7-8 (more than 75% of families report that they
cannot find reliable care providers, and 80% report that they do not have enough money to
pay for care that their family member with a disability needs).28 See infra Part III.C-D.
2015] 1263
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
eligibility for individuals with intellectual or other serious disabilities by
creating a tax-preferred savings account, the contents of which are not counted
against Medicaid eligibility. This Part argues that although passage of the
ABLE Act was a watershed moment for individuals with intellectual
disabilities in the workforce, it remains a second-best solution. Once again, it
relies on private actors for its implementation, but not all individuals with
disabilities have access to private assistance or funds. As a result, like many
tax expenditures, the ABLE Act favors legally sophisticated families who have
disposable income. It may provide little or no additional Medicaid access to
others.
Part VI concludes that removal of income and asset restrictions on the
provision of government-coordinated habilitative care is a superior, if counter-
intuitive, solution. It is a public solution that does not rely on private actors or
funds for its implementation. It would satisfy normative goals on multiple
fronts by preserving the autonomy of individuals with intellectual or other
serious disabilities, by eliminating perverse incentives that encourage reduced
employment and counterproductive trust planning, and by removing barriers
that exclude families with lesser access to disposable income or legal advice.
In addition, higher levels of workforce participation and saving by individuals
with disabilities and their families would lessen the dependency of those
individuals on non-disability-related government programs, freeing assets in
those programs for other uses.
II. A LAY PERSON'S BACKGROUNDER
A. Antidiscrimination Law As an Incomplete Solution
Calls for disability law reform have evolved from custodialism to post-
integrationism over several decades. 29 Prior to the 1970s, the prevailing norm
for care of individuals with disabilities was custodialism, in which individuals
with significant disabilities were cared for in institutional settings. 30 The late
1960s, with the rise of the civil rights movement, marked a turning point in
legal thinking about disability, with advocates calling for full inclusion of
individuals with disabilities into work and community life. 31 Called
"integrationism" by its founders, Jacobus tenBroek and Floyd Matson, this
movement was "part of a progression from the idea that others need to care for
and protect persons with disabilities-custodialism-toward the idea that
persons with disabilities should assert their own rights to equal treatment." 32
29 See Weber, supra note 26, at 890-91 (observing that since the mid-twentieth
century, "dramatic changes have occurred in the field of disability equality").
30 See Seto & Buhai, supra note 26, at 1055-56 (providing an overview of the
development of the post-integrationist model of disability law).
31 Id.; see also Weber, supra note 26, at 889 (describing progression in legal
thinking).32 Weber, supra note 26, at 890.
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The late twentieth century saw notable victories of integrationism over
custodialism in federal law, culminating in Congress's 1990 enactment of the
ADA. 33 As the Supreme Court noted in Olmstead, the preamble to the ADA
observes that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities," and that "discrimination against individuals with
disabilities persists in such critical areas as .. . institutionalization." 34
Accordingly, Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment. 35
Title II prohibits discrimination in public services provided by government,36
and Title III prohibits discrimination in public accommodations provided by
private actors. 37
The Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead was also a victory for
integration, albeit a measured one.38 The case involved two women who were
confined to the psychiatric unit of an Atlanta hospital but who could have been
given appropriate care in a community setting.39 The women claimed that
Georgia's failure to provide such care violated Title II of the ADA.40 In its
ruling for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court wrote that institutionalization
"severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including
family relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence,
educational advancement, and cultural enrichment." 4 1 In construing the
ADA's mandate that individuals with disabilities not "be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities
of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity," 42 the
Court looked to a regulation of the Attorney General requiring public entities,
such as the Atlanta hospital, to "administer services, programs, and activities
in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals
with disabilities." 43 The Court concluded that states must provide treatment in
33 The most celebrated of these, the ADA, prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability "in private employment, state and local governmental services, public
accommodations, public transportation, communications, and other activities." Id. at 890-
91. Precursors to the ADA included the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which "forbade
discrimination against persons with disabilities in federally assisted activities," and the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, which "required that all children
with disabilities receive a free, appropriate public education." Id at 890.
34 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 588 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(3)).
35 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 101-108,
104 Stat. 327, 303-37 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2012)).
36 Id. §§ 201-246, 104 Stat. at 337-53 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-
12165 (2012)).
3 7Id. §§ 301-310, 104 Stat. at 353-65 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-
12189 (2012)).
38 See generally Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581.
391d. at 581 (syllabus).
40 Id
4 1 Id. at 601.
4242 U.S.C. § 12132.
43 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 592 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998)).
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the community rather than in an institution when state medical professionals
determine that a community placement is appropriate; the individual with a
disability does not oppose community placement; and "the placement can be
reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the
State and the needs of others with mental disabilities."44 In other words, the
requirements of the ADA are met if a state has "a comprehensive, effectively
working plan" to place individuals with disabilities "in less restrictive
settings," and a wait list that moves "at a reasonable pace not controlled by the
State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated." 45 Two things are
notable about the Court's decision. First, integration was clearly the driving
force behind the Court's decision, and second, the Court struck a very
pragmatic balance between the interests of states and those of individuals with
disabilities.
In recent years, litigated disputes between the federal government and the
states have highlighted the potential reach of Olmstead and have increased
access to community integration for individuals with disabilities who receive
government-coordinated habilitative care.46 For example, a recent consent
decree with Rhode Island requires the state to provide work opportunities for
individuals with serious disabilities who are currently participating in sheltered
workshops or who are graduating from high school.47 The state must provide
support for forty hours during the work week, with the expectation that
individuals will work, on average, in a supported employment job at
competitive wages for at least twenty hours per week.48 For the remainder of
the time, the state will assist individuals in community living "by aiding the
development of social capital, including broad personal and professional
networks, and individuals' active participation and membership in integrated
settings." 49 In addition, services "must include an adequate mix of leisure,
employment-related, and daily life activities that are comparable to those
activities" of typically-abled peers.50 An interim agreement with Texas
requires the state to extend additional community living options to Medicaid-
eligible individuals currently in congregate care, including "supported and
competitive employment, community volunteer activities, community learning
and recreational opportunities, and other integrated day activities."51 The
government reached a similar settlement with Virginia that applies only to
44 Id. at 607.
45 Id. at 605-06 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.).
46 See Olmstead Enforcement, supra note 16 (providing summaries of and links to
litigated disputes).
47 Consent Decree at 11-13, United States v. Rhode Island, No. 1:14-CV-00175-L-
PAS (D. R.I. Apr. 8, 2014).
4 8 Id.
49 1d. at 12.
50d
51 Interim Settlement Agreement at 9, Steward v. Perry, No. 5: 10-CV-01025-OG
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2013).
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those individuals who qualify for state assistance or who are currently residing
in an institution. 52 An agreement with Georgia requires the state to cease
admitting individuals with disabilities to state-operated institutions entirely
and to instead provide home and community based habilitative care, including
supports for the families of individuals with disabilities. 53 These broad
agreements undoubtedly facilitate the integration of individuals with
disabilities into the community in states where they apply.
While they are great victories, the Olmstead consent decrees are not
enough. They do not adequately protect individuals with disabilities who do
not qualify for government assistance on financial grounds. Title II of the
ADA prohibits discrimination in access to public services by requiring that
"no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason ofsuch disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by
any such entity." 54 The ADA says nothing about the exclusion of individuals
from government programs on the basis of income, despite the fact that
individuals with disabilities who wish to live in the community may need
access to government programs that are not adequately replicated in the private
market.55 To benefit from the breadth of the ADA under the Olmstead decrees,
most individuals with disabilities still must qualify for Medicaid.56
Medicaid eligibility remains a critical and high hurdle to the receipt of
government-coordinated habilitative care. As the twenty-fifth anniversary of
the ADA and the fifteenth anniversary of Olmstead approach, it has become
clear that the simple prohibition on discrimination embodied in the ADA is not
sufficient to safeguard the quality of life of individuals with disabilities, and
particularly individuals with intellectual disabilities. 57 Integration must be
accompanied by social support that is available to all individuals with
significant disabilities and not just those whose level of impoverishment
qualifies them for Medicaid.
52 Settlement Agreement at 3, United States v. Virginia, No. 3:12-CV-00059-JAG
(E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 2012) (defining target population for receipt of services described in the
settlement).
53 Settlement Agreement at 5, United States v. Georgia, No. 1:10-CV-249-CAP (N.D.
Ga Oct. 19, 2010).
54 ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (emphasis added).
5 5 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
5 6 For a discussion of the impact of Olmstead on entitlement to home-based
community services for individuals who meet means testing requirements, see generally
Mark C. Weber, Home and Community-Based Services, Olmstead, and Positive Rights: A
Preliminary Discussion, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 269 (2004).
57 See Colker, supra note 26, at 1422-23 ("Support for integration has not always
accompanied support for genuine equality as measured by the principle of anti-
subordination.").
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B. Setting Goals for Reform
Current scholarship on disability theory recognizes not only the need for
prohibitions on discrimination but also the need for positive intervention to
remove structural barriers that prevent individuals with disabilities from
accessing and participating in the workforce and community.58 For example,
although an employer may not exclude an otherwise qualified employee on the
basis of disability, nothing in the ADA requires the employer to help the
employee choose appropriate clothing or travel to work.59 The needs for these
things-a separate workplace location and a particular style of dress, such as a
wrinkle-free shirt-are social constructs based on typically-abled employees,
and they create barriers to employment that are not mitigated by a simple ban
on discrimination. 60 As Ted Seto and Sande Buhai have described it, these
impediments to full participation "have not been decreed by immutable natural
laws . . . . They represent conscious choices that had the effect of including
some groups, such as the dominant segments of society, and excluding others
who were 'different' or disabled." 61 Currently, the costs of removing these
barriers to full participation in work and other community activities fall
primarily not on those who have created them, but rather on individuals with
disabilities. 62 These individuals, however, may not be well-positioned to
defray such costs and are therefore disadvantaged in both the workplace and
the community.63
Mitigation of structural barriers can be accomplished in part through laws
that either remove them or provide a means of surmounting them. The social
safety net is of critical importance in this regard.64 "In short," Samuel
Bagenstos has argued, "the future of disability law lies as much in social
welfare law as in antidiscrimination law." 65 Similarly, Francine Lipman has
written, "If people with disabilities are to realize the promise of emancipation,
society must ... implement more aggressive measures that redistribute power
and material resources in their favor." 66 Medicaid eligibility, and in particular
the way in which it affects the eligibility pool for government-coordinated
habilitative services, is an obvious target for reform.
5 8 See Lipman, supra note 26, at 411 ("Specialized treatment is necessary to provide
people with disabilities as a group sufficient power to end their disadvantaged status.").
5 9 See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 25-26 (describing structural barriers to
employment).
60 Id
61 Seto & Buhai, supra note 26, at 1072 (quoting Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and
the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 166,
174 (2000)).6 2 Lipman, supra note 26, at 409.
63Id. at 410 (observing that individuals with disabilities "have neither the resources
nor the opportunities to achieve superiority").6 4 See id. (calling for redistribution to individuals with disabilities).
65 Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 4.
6 6 Lipman, supra note 26, at 410.
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Autonomy and integrated living, to the extent that they are feasible and
desired by particular individuals with disabilities, have historically been and
should remain important goals of reform. 67 Both are forwarded by access to
habilitative services such as in-home assistance, transportation assistance, and
adaptive equipment. Without these goals, and without such services, the law
may regress toward custodialism. More than 187,000 individuals with
intellectual or developmental disabilities lived in state institutions in 1967.68
That number had fallen below 34,000 in 2009, and today, most individuals
with intellectual or developmental disabilities live with their families. 69
Without a continued focus on fostering autonomy and independent living for
these individuals, families will be unable to meet the challenges posed by
caretaking. 70 These families have very little market recourse, and without
government assistance, integrated living arrangements may become unduly
difficult.7 1
Because of the distinctive needs of individuals with disabilities,
antidiscrimination measures have proven inadequate to address barriers to
integration. 72 A second goal for reform should be to revise Medicaid eligibility
rules in a way that avoids reliance on norms that have developed over time
with reference to people who are typically-abled. "[S]pecial treatment for
people with disabilities remains necessary in society and in the economy." 73
As a result, scholars and advocates for reform must "imagine a world that
acknowledges the fact of disability but avoids relying on norms and standards
drawn with reference to the nondisabled individual." 74 These norms include
adult self-sufficiency, the expectation of regular employment, literacy, and
numeracy among others.75 Stated more specifically, current Medicaid
67 Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 7-8 (noting "broad agreement among diverse
disability rights activists" on goals of autonomy and full integration).
68 THE ARC, supra note 4, at 3.
6 9 Id.
70 See id. at 6 (nearly half of all caregivers report that they have more caregiving
responsibilities than they can handle, and in twenty percent of families, one member has
quit a job to stay home and provide support).
71 For instance, in the FINDS survey, more than eighty percent of families reported
problems with finding noninstitutional community services, trained reliable home care
providers, or respite services. Id. at 7.
72 See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 4-5 ("Although this point may not be obvious
from a scan of legal scholarship, activists 'on the ground' have increasingly understood the
importance of the social welfare system to achieving the goals of the disability rights
movement." (footnote omitted)); Weber, supra note 26, at 891 ("The economic role of
people with disabilities continues to depend less on the law of employment discrimination
than on the law of welfare . . .").
73 Weber, supra note 26, at 891.
74 d. at 891-92.
75 For instance, Mark Weber has argued that designing reasonable accommodations
with reference to typically-abled people may further the integration of individuals with
disabilities but may not fully address concerns about dignity and equality. Mark C. Weber,
Disability Rights, Welfare Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2483, 2503-08 (2011).
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eligibility rules assume that an adult who earns a sufficient amount of income
or who possesses a sufficient amount of assets does not need habilitative
assistance. In addition, the rules assume that a Medicaid claimant is able to
understand the import of income and asset guidelines and to comply with
them. This assumption may be unfounded in the case of individuals with
intellectual and developmental disabilities, and yet failure to comply with the
rules can result in the loss of habilitative care. Finally, by penalizing through
loss of benefits individuals with disabilities who receive financial assistance
from family and friends, the law embodies a stark false dichotomy between
dependent and independent living. The issue of means testing was not
addressed by the Affordable Care Act, meaning that change remains
necessary. 76 Any reform to the Medicaid eligibility rules affecting the
provision of habilitative care should be cognizant of such assumptions.
Making access to Medicaid waiver services dependent upon the income and
asset holdings of the individual recipient does little to forward that vision.
Rather, it imposes upon the individual and his or her family a social construct
that direct beneficiaries of the social safety net must be economically poor.
As a third goal, reform should abandon facial neutrality of the law in favor
of equality of opportunity to maximize individual utility.77 (For the sake of
simplicity, I will refer to this as "opportunity" or "quality of life," although as
I discuss in Part V, the distinctive needs of individuals with significant
disabilities and the lack of homogeneity among their typically-abled
counterparts make true comparison impossible for purposes of assessing
horizontal equity. My comparison here is simply for the sake of rough justice.)
Although strict income and/or asset limitations currently apply to all Medicaid
claimants (i.e., the law is somewhat neutral on its face), the interaction of
physical, intellectual, and developmental impediments with structural barriers
to inclusion produces an adverse impact on individuals with significant
disabilities. 78 For all other claimants, the eligibility rules act as a gatekeeper to
Medicaid programs that cover traditional healthcare, but for individuals with
significant disabilities, they regulate access to both traditional healthcare and
government-coordinated habilitative care. Without habilitative care,
individuals with significant disabilities cannot have opportunities for the
maximization of personal utility that are functionally equivalent to those of
76 For a discussion of the Affordable Care Act's effect on access to disability-related
social services, see infra Part III.D.4.
77 Here, I am not referring to opportunities for employment, but rather to
opportunities for an individual to maximize his or her utility. Maximization of personal
utility might, for some individuals, come from employment, but for others, it might come
from taking a class, enjoying time outside, or simply having company. Because the
spectrum of disabilities covered by government-coordinated habilitative care is wide, a
one-size-fits-all definition of opportunity (such as employment) would not be appropriate.
781 am not claiming that individuals with severe disabilities are the only subgroup of
Medicaid claimants that are adversely impacted. Because they are the focus of my inquiry,
though, I will confine my discussion to the impact of eligibility rules on those individuals.
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their typically-abled counterparts. 79 To produce some semblance of neutrality
with regard to opportunity, the law must account for the different ex ante
positions of individuals with disabilities and those without. Medicaid income
and asset limitations not only prevent individuals with significant disabilities
from claiming traditional healthcare, but they also bar the delivery of services
uniquely tailored to distinctive natural impediments as well as socially
constructed barriers to full participation in the community. Failure to meet the
income and asset requirements, then, affects more than just medical outcomes
for individuals with significant disabilities. It also affects social and economic
wellbeing; education and employment opportunities; political influence; and
the satisfaction of other preferences tied to community living. Because
Medicaid eligibility requirements produce this disparate result solely with
reference to significant disability, they are discriminatory in their effect and
should be amended to account not for the relative economic position of
claimants ex ante but for the effect of eligibility on their opportunities and
quality of life ex post.80
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF HABILITATIVE CARE
AND RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS
Social support, particularly habilitative care, is essential to the integration
of individuals with developmental disabilities into the community. 81 As
Professor Bagenstos has noted, "[M]any individuals with disabilities face
significant barriers to employment that operate well before they are ever in a
position to be discriminated against . ."82 This is because they may have
difficulty with everyday activities. As a result, "[miany people with disabilities
need personal-assistance services-attendants who assist with personal
hygiene and other activities of daily living-to help them get out of bed and
get to work." 83 In addition, these individuals may require assistive technology
and transportation alternatives to fully participate in community life. 84
Statistics bear out the asserted need for habilitative care. A 2001 study
estimated that over 65% of individuals with intellectual or developmental
disabilities need assistance with activities of daily living, including bathing,
79 Larson et al., supra note 6, at 6 (finding that over 65% of individuals with
intellectual or developmental disabilities need assistance with activities of daily living).
801 recognize that under some theories of justice, this argument may lead to the
conclusion that groups other than individuals with severe disabilities should receive
government-coordinated habilitative care. This, however, is not the subject of my inquiry,
so I will not address it in this paper. I also do not attempt to argue that the Medicaid
eligibility rules are unconstitutional as a result of disparate impact.
81 See NDSS, supra note 1.
82 Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 25.
83 Id
84 Id. at 26.
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dressing, eating, using a toilet, and getting in and out of bed.85 In a 2010
national survey, more than 40% of family caregivers reported that individuals
with intellectual or developmental disabilities had unmet needs "getting
outside of the home for errands or to see a doctor. . . , managing finances ... ,
transportation.. . , and household management." 86 More than 80% of family
caregivers also reported providing transportation, cooking, doing laundry, or
cleaning the house for their family member with a disability.87 Over 70%
reported providing support with financial affairs, social arrangements,
monitoring outside services, home maintenance, or recreational activities.88
Sixty-nine percent provided help with administration of medications, and
sixty-one percent aided in personal care and toilette.89 Eighty-four percent of
these families reported difficulty in finding reliable home care providers;90
80% did not have enough money to pay for care,91 and only 8% received
private insurance funds to cover the cost of providing such care.92 Failure of
the private market for habilitative care is clear, and government assistance is
justified in this context.
States typically provide coordinated habilitative care through a program
colloquially referred to as a Medicaid or HCBS "waiver." 93 This section will
provide a brief history of waiver programs, and it will describe, in pragmatic
terms, the importance of waiver programs to individuals with intellectual
disabilities. Finally, because access to waiver programs requires Medicaid
eligibility, this section will describe Medicaid eligibility requirements that may
apply to individuals with intellectual disabilities in various states.
A. The Enactment of Waivers: A Shift from Custodialism to
Integrationism
A 1981 amendment to section 1915(c) of the Social Security Act-the
Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS) waiver program-permits the
federal government to waive certain Medicaid eligibility requirements,
85 Larson et al., supra note 6, at 6.
8 6 LYNDA ANDERSON ET AL., UNIV. OF MINN., RESEARCH & TRAINING CTR. ON CMTY.
LIVING, 2010 FAMILY AND INDIVIDUAL NEEDS FOR DISABILITY SUPPORTS (FINDS)
NATIONAL SURVEY, TECHNICAL REPORT PART 1, at 9-10 (May 2011),
http://www.thearc.org/document.doc?id=3673 [http://perma.cc/Q2MN-8K6F] [hereinafter
2010 FINDS SURVEY].8 7Id. at 10.
88 d.
89 Id
90 Id. at iv.
9 1 Id. at 24.
92 2010 FINDS SURVEY, supra note 86, at 12.
93 This a shortened way of referring to the Home and Community-Based Services
(HCBS) Waiver program, which was enacted in section 1915(c) of the Social Security Act
to provide community-based alternatives to institutionalization for individuals who are
elderly, handicapped, or have intellectual disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (2012).
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allowing states to offer community-based care as an alternative to
institutionalization for individuals who are elderly or who have qualifying
disabilities. 94 Prior to the federal government's creation of the waiver
program, many individuals with intellectual or other qualifying disabilities
received habilitative care solely within the confines of an institution. 95
Several factors led to Congressional recognition that community-based
care was an important addition to social safety net.96 First, waivers were seen
as "a first step towards recognizing that many individuals at risk of
institutionalization can be supported in their homes and communities, thereby
preserving their independence and bonds to family and friends, at a cost not
higher than institutional care." 97 This was important because those individuals
"frequently reported an unsatisfactory quality of life." 98  Second,
institutionalization was too common.99 A number of studies showed that "at
least one-third of persons residing in nursing facilities that were Medicaid
funded would have been capable of living at home or in community residential
settings if additional supportive services were available." 00 Finally,
institutionalization was too costly.' 01 At the time, "[a] disproportionate
percentage of Medicaid resources were being used for institutional long-term
care."l 02 Furthermore, the cost was not likely to decline.1 03 A
contemporaneous study predicted that Medicaid nursing home expenditures
94 See id.; see also Mary Jane Duckett & Mary R. Guy, Home and Community-Based
Services Waivers, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv., Fall 2000, at 123, 123,
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/HealthCareFinancing
Review/downloads/oofallpgl23.pdf [http://perma.cc/6ETN-LRGX]; Allen J. LeBlanc et
al., Medicaid 1915(c) Home and Community-Based Services Waivers Across the States,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Winter 2000, at 159, 159-60, http://www.cms.gov/
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/HealthCareFinancingReview/downloads/
00winterpgl59.pdf [http://perma.cc/QNV6-HTCJ].
95 See Colker, supra note 26, at 1427-28 (describing the rise in prevalence of
residential institutions serving individuals with disabilities during the 1950s through
1970s).
96 It is worth noting that waiver services are also available not only to individuals with
intellectual disabilities, but also to some individuals who are elderly or who have a certain
physical disabilities. 42 C.F.R. § 441.301(b)(6) (2015) provides that states may provide a
waiver to the aged or disabled, individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities,
and individuals with mental illness.
9 7 See Duckett & Guy, supra note 94, at 123.
9 8Id
99 Id
1 00 Id.; see also A.E. Benjamin, An Historical Perspective on Home Care Policy, 71
MILBANK Q. 129, 145 (1993) (describing conclusion of the Congressional Budget Office
that up to between twenty to forty percent of individuals in institutions could be cared for
less intensively).
101 Duckett & Guy, supra note 94, at 123.
102 Bn
103 Benjamin, supra note 100, at 145.
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would triple over the coming decade, 104 but in 1981, Congress and the Reagan
administration slashed the federal budget.105 Waivers were statutorily required
to "provide a cost-neutral alternative to institutional care, requiring the States
to keep waiver costs at or below those of comparable institution-based
service." 06 Finally, the matter carried some urgency as courts across the
country were issuing orders to "deinstitutionalize persons with developmental
disabilities." 0 7 Congress's recognition of the need for some autonomy and
community access, coupled with courts' move toward forced
deinstitutionalization culminated in the creation of waiver programs across the
country and signaled a move away from a custodial model of care for
individuals with developmental disabilities.
B. Waiver Services
Waiver programs allow states to provide a wide range of habilitative
services through Medicaid. 08 These services typically include aids to daily
living such as personal care, homemaking, companionship, transportation, and
adult day care. 109 They also include case management by a social worker, and
for individuals who have a regular caretaker, respite care which provides the
regular caretaker with a break.' 10 The Social Security Act explicitly provides
for those enumerated services, but other services can be provided by a state if
the federal government approves the service. 1 1 Because of this, "[s]tates have
a great deal of flexibility in designing their own unique HCBS waiver
program(s)."ll 2 The original waivers focused on the individuals who were
elderly or who had a qualifying disability (typically an intellectual disability)
but the program has evolved to include waiver services that assist individuals
with "physical disabilities, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS),
acquired brain injuries and other forms of severe disability, including, to a
limited extent, chronic mental illness."I 13
104 Id.
1 05 John William Ellwood, Congress Cuts the Budget: The Omnibus Reconciliation Act
of 1981, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Spring 1982, at 50, 50, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/1 0.1111/1 540-5850.00549/pdf [http://perma.cc/E57W-38VW].
1 06 See LeBlanc et al., supra note 94, at 160.
107 Duckett & Guy, supra note 94, at 123.
10842 C.F.R. § 440.180(b) (2015) (listing specific services, including the following:
(1) case management, (2) homemaker, (3) home health aide, (4) personal care, (5) adult
day health care, (6) habilitation, and (7) respite care).
109 Id.
110Id.
111 See Duckett & Guy, supra note 94, at 124.
112 See id.
113 LeBlanc et al., supra note 94, at 159-60.
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Various states provide a range of waiver services to individuals with
qualifying disabilities.11 4 For instance, in Illinois, the Persons with Disabilities
Waiver provides services including a personal assistant, home health aide,
homemaker, adult day care, and specialized medical equipment.' 5 Similarly,
the Adults with Developmental Disabilities Waiver provides services
including home accessibility modifications, personal support, vehicle
modification, skilled nursing, and occupational, speech and physical
therapy.11 6 Another state, Ohio, provides services as varied as adult daycare,
home delivered meals, and even pest control.' 17 All of these are examples of
services that recognize the individual needs of people with qualifying
disabilities while allowing them to live more independently in the larger
community.
C. Restrictions on Eligibility
Waivers, while generally necessary for supported community living, are
not universally available to individuals with disabilities. Instead, eligibility is
restricted on the basis of medical and financial need." 8 Because waivers were
created as an alternative to institutionalization, federal regulations initially
required states to offer them only to individuals who were eligible to be
institutionalized.11 9 That restriction was loosened in 1997, and states may now
choose to extend services to some individuals who would not qualify for
institutional care.1 20 In addition, federal law places financial restrictions on the
receipt of waiver services. 12 1 "States have the option of setting financial
eligibility criteria for the 1915(c) waivers at the same level as those for
institutional placement, up to 300 percent of [the $2,000] Supplemental
1l 4 All fifty states provide waiver services to some degree. For additional information
on states' allocation of resources to waiver programs, see Medicaid Section 1915(c) Home
and Community-Based Services Waivers Participants, by Type of Waiver, KAISER
FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/participants-by-hcbs-waiver-type/
[http://perma.cc/8JVE-YWW5].
115Persons with Disabilities, ILL. DEP'T HEALTHCARE & FAM. SERVS.,
http://www.illinois.gov/hfs/MedicalClients/HCBS/Pages/disablities.aspx [http://perma.cc/
MG4X-N9CK].
I 16 Adults with Developmental Disabilities, ILL. DEP'T HEALTHCARE & FAM. SERvS.,
http://www.illinois.gov/hfs/MedicalClients/HCBS/Pages/DD.aspx [http://perma.cc/CK9C-
NBFW].
I17For a fuller description of Ohio's waiver services, see infra note 128 and
accompanying text.
118 For a description of eligibility restrictions, see-LeBlanc et al., supra note 94, at 160.
11942 C.F.R. § 441.302(c)(1) (2015) (requiring that an evaluation show a reasonable
chance that the individual would require institutional care within a month if waiver services
are not provided).
120 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(i) (2012).
1 2 11d. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii).
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Security Income (SSI) [asset holdings limitation]." 22 Alternatively, states may
have more stringent financial requirements for eligibility. 123 Finally, each state
must place a limit on the number of people who can receive the benefits of the
waiver program. 124 As a result, it may be difficult for an individual to qualify
for waiver services despite the importance of those sevices for inclusion in the
community.
State restrictions on waiver eligibility generally track the federal statute
with minor variations. For instance, New York focuses somewhat on
autonomy. To be eligible for a waiver on the basis of developmental disability,
an individual must be eligible for Medicaid; have a diagnosed developmental
disability; be eligible for institutional care; have exercised agency in making
the decision between receipt of waiver services or placement in an institutional
facility; and maintain an appropriate living arrangement.1 25 Illinois adds
language on cost-effectiveness. There, an individual must be a United States
citizen or legal alien; be a resident of Illinois; be financially eligible for
Medicaid; and require the necessary level of care for the requested waiver. 126
In addition, it must cost less to provide waiver services than it would cost to
provide appropriate institutional care. 127 Another variant, Ohio, focuses on
categorization by providing different eligibility standards for an entire
smorgasbord of waivers.1 28
122 LeBlanc et al., supra note 94, at 160. The asset limitation for SSI is $6,000 for an
individual in 2014, 300% of $2,000. See OASDI and SSI Program Rates & Limits, 2014,
Soc. SEC. ADMIN. (Oct. 2013), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/prog
highlights/RatesLimits2014.html [http://perma.cc/S2FZ-GRYU] [hereinafter SSI Limits].
123 SSI Limits, supra note 122 (showing that the statute creates a ceiling by specifying
maximum income eligibility).
12442 U.S.C. § 1396n(i)(1)(C).
1 2 5 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 635-10.3 (2008).
126 Home and Community Based Services Waiver Program, ILL. DEP'T HEALTHCARE &
FAM. SERVS., http://www.illinois.gov/hfs/medicalclients/HCBS/Pages/default.aspx [http://
perma.cc/4XLU-2B5B] [hereinafter IL HCBS]. Recipients may be eligible through the
traditional route or through Medicaid buy-in, which allows individuals whose income
exceeds the prescribed amount to purchase Medicaid access. This encourages Medicaid
recipients to return to work while allowing them to maintain their Medicaid eligibility
through the program. To be eligible for Medicaid under the buy-in program, known as
Health Benefits for Workers with Disabilities (HBWD), an individual must (1) be
ineligible for Medicaid for those with disabilities, (2) be a resident of Illinois, (3) be a U.S.
Citizen or an eligible noncitizen, (4) be between the ages of 16 and 65, (5) meet the SSA
definition of disability, (6) have a disability, (7) be employed, (8) have countable assets of
$25,000 or less, and (9) have income less than 350% of the federal poverty line for the
family size. See HBWD Eligibility, HEALTH BENEFITS FOR WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES
(HBWD), http://www.hbwdillinois.com/eligibility.html [http://perma.cc/P6C8-L6EX].
127 IL HCBS, supra note 126.
128 To be eligible for waiver services in Ohio, an individual must be (1) eligible for
Ohio Medicaid (through traditional Medicaid or the Medicaid buy-in), (2) in need of HCB
Waiver services, and (3) enrolled in at least one HCB Waiver program. Each of the waivers
in Ohio has its own set of eligibility criteria, but none are less restrictive than the general
eligibility criteria listed above. They include, but are not limited to, the following: First, the
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In all of the examples above, access to waiver services is limited on the
basis of medical need (if one assumes that habilitative care is medical), but
more importantly for individuals with qualifying disabilities, on the basis of
financial need with waiver eligibility generally pegged to Medicaid eligibility.
As discussed below, the definition of financial need adopted by the various
states is unduly restrictive in many cases.1 29 In other words, a real-world
definition of financial need, if one were to craft it, likely would be much
broader than the legal definitions adopted by the federal government and the
various states. As a result, it may be difficult for individuals to obtain waiver
services even when financial need is real and habilitative need is great.
D. Waiver Eligibility Is Generally Pegged to Medicaid Eligibility, and
Medicaid Is Only Available to the Very Poor
To be eligible for waiver services, an individual with intellectual or other
qualifying disabilities generally must qualify for Medicaid assistance.
Established in 1965, "[t]he Medical Assistance program, commonly known as
'Medicaid,' 'is a cooperative federal-state venture designed to afford medical
assistance to persons whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the
Ohio Home Care Waiver (OHCW) Program provides nursing, personal care and skilled
therapy services in addition to other more specific services. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5160-46-
04 (2015). To be eligible for OHCW, an individual must be financially eligible for HCBS
in Ohio, be fifty-nine years or younger and require an intermediate or skilled level of care.
The Ohio Home Care Waiver Program, OHIO DEP'T MEDICAID, http://medicaid.ohio.gov/
FOROHIOANS/Programs/OhioHomeCareWaiver.aspx [http://perma.cc/AF6H-T5RX].
Second, the Assisted Living Waiver Program pays the costs of living in an assisted living
waiver program, freeing up income for the waiver beneficiary. Assisted Living Waiver
Program, OHIO DEP'T MEDICAID, http://medicaid.ohio.gov/FOROHIOANS/Programs/
AssistedLiving.aspx [http://perma.cc/QLK6-AK9C]. To be eligible for the Assisted Living
Waiver, individuals must be eligible for Medicaid, 21 years old or older, and in need of at
least intermediary care. Id. Third, the PASSPORT Waiver Program provides a similar
package of services as the Choices program, but is more widely available. PASSPORT
Program, OHIO DEP'T AGING, http://www.aging.ohio.gov/services/passport/ [http://
perma.cc/SB7K-FR5S]. To be eligible for PASSPORT, an individual must be eligible for
Medicaid, sixty years old or older, and in need of at least intermediary care. Id. In addition,
some costs that the state pays for can be subject to estate recovery by Ohio. Id. Finally, the
Individual Options Waiver Program and the Level One Waiver Program offer a similar list
of services that are available, with the Level One program providing more options for
services overall. To be eligible for either of those waiver programs, an individual must be
eligible for Medicaid and need an ICF-IID (Level One), see Level One Waiver Program,
OHIO DEP'T MEDICAID, http://medicaid.ohio.gov/FOROHIOANS/Programs/LevelOne.aspx
[http://perma.cc/5ZDR-KZ7V], or ICF-MR (Individual Options) level of care, see
Individual Options Waiver Program, OHIO DEP'T MEDICAID, http://medicaid.ohio.gov/
FOROHIOANS/Programs/IndividualOptions.aspx [http://perma.cc/D7PJ-SUQX].
129 See infra Part III.D.
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financial demands of necessary care and services."' 30 States administer the
federal program and receive reimbursements for administration costs and
"partial reimbursement for the costs of providing medical services."1 31
Each state sets its own Medicaid eligibility rules within guidelines
provided by the federal government. States have three options for eligibility
determinations applicable to individuals with disabilities.1 32 (A fourth method
of eligibility determination, the use of modified adjusted gross income under
the Affordable Care Act, applies to waiver services only at the election of the
states and so far is of little help to individuals with disabilities who are seeking
waiver services.)1 33 First, under section 1634 of the Social Security Act, a state
may provide Medicaid to anyone who is determined to be eligible for
supplemental security income (known as "SSI," or more commonly,
"welfare") by the Social Security Administration.1 34 Second, a state also may
choose to grant Medicaid to all SSI recipients who complete a separate state
application. 135 Third, under section 209(b) of the Social Security Act, a state
may choose criteria that are more restrictive than SSI criteria, as long as they
are not more stringent than the criteria used by the state in 1972.136 This is
commonly referred to as the 209(b) option.
1 30 Ramey v. Reinertson, 268 F.3d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting N.M. Dep't of
Human Servs. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Health Care Fin. Admin., 4 F.3d 882,
883 (10th Cir. 1993)).
131 Id
1 32 See 42 C.F.R. § 435.601 (2015) (describing financial eligibility methodologies that
states may use).
133 See id. § 435.603(a), (j) (2015) (requiring states to calculate financial eligibility on
the basis of modified adjusted gross income except in enumerated cases, of which
disability is one); see also Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP
Servs., MAGI: Medicaid and CHIP's New Eligibility Standards 1 (Sept. 30,
2013), http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/program-information/
downloads/modified-adjusted-gross-income-and-medicaid-chip.pdf [http://perma.cc/9Z5C-
K39H] ("The new rules apply to most people who are eligible for Medicaid and CHIP, but
not the elderly or people who qualify based on a disability."); MARYBETH MUSUMECI, THE
KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, ISSUE BRIEF: THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT'S IMPACT ON MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY, ENROLLMENT, AND BENEFITS FOR PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES 4 (Apr. 2014), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/
8390-02-the-affordable-care-acts-impact-on-medicaid-eligibility.pdf [http://perma.cc/N7PS-
YU63].
1 34 See 42 C.F.R. § 435.601 (describing financial eligibility methodologies that states
may apply).
1 35 Id. States electing this option include Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada,
Oregon, Utah and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. See SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM (POMS), at SI 01715.010 (May 2014)
[hereinafter POMS], https://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/Inx/0501715010 [http://pertna.cc/
UJ5E-YZ7D]; see, e.g., State of Alaska, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Pub.
Assistance, Application for Services (revised Feb. 2012), http://dpaweb.hss.state.ak.us/e-
forms/pdf/gen50b.pdf [http://perma.cc/P2QY-Z6ST].
136 42 C.F.R. § 435.811(d); Ind. Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Payne, 592 N.E.2d 714, 722
(Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that Indiana's Medicaid eligibility requirements in 1972
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1. Medicaid Eligibility Under Section 1634 of the Social Security Act
To qualify for Medicaid, a person must satisfy stringent restrictions on
income, asset holding, and severity of disability.1 37 In many states, an
individual with a disability is eligible for Medicaid if that individual also is
eligible for supplemental security income (SSI) under federal rules.1 38 An
individual is eligible for SSI if that individual meets several requirements
including but not limited to the following: the individual is aged, blind, or
disabled; has a limited income;1 39 and has limited resources.1 40 Other
requirements include certain restrictions on citizenship, time spent abroad, and
fulfillment of certain administrative requirements.141
For SSI purposes, "disability" is the "inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 This
definition of disability "is much more exacting" 43 than the definition provided
by the ADA, which merely requires "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities."144 Because the scope of
the SSI definition has been discussed elsewhere, let us assume (perhaps
unrealistically) that most individuals with intellectual or other qualifying
disabilities meet the definition and that income and asset limitations are the
primary impediments to Medicaid eligibility.1 45
The income limitations applicable to SSI eligibility are strict. The
maximum federal benefit available to an otherwise qualifying individual who
pays for her own living expense is $733 per month in 2015.146 A qualifying
allowed a resource spend down and the state's current rule could not be more restrictive
that its 1972 resource rule).
137 See generally Part III.D. (describing eligibility requirements).
138 Only ten states do not use the SSI rules as a basis for determining eligibility. They
are Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia. See POMS,supra note 135, at SI 01715.010.
139 Soc. SEC. ADMIN, UNDERSTANDING SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME 10-12
(2015) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING SSI], https://www.socialsecurity.gov/ssi/text-
understanding-ssi.htm [https://perma.cc/Q69D-L7GD] (explaining that limited income
includes money earned at work, free food and shelter, and any other money received such
as SSI, worker's comp., and unemployment benefits).
140Id. at 9 (explaining that limited resources are $2,000 for an individual, and $3,000
for a couple with certain exclusions).
141Id. at 12.
14242 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012).
143 Weber, supra note 26, at 896.
1 44 ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(l)(A).
1 4 5 Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 33; Lucie Schmidt, The Supplemental Security Income
Program and Welfare Reform 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Public Policy Discussion
Paper No. 12-3, 2012), http://ssm.com/abstract-2285082 [http://perma.cc/F6TR-EVJ8].
14 6 See UNDERSTANDING SSI, supra note 139, at 9.
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couple may receive up to $1,082 in the same circumstance. 147 These amounts
are reduced dollar-for-dollar by "countable income."1 48 The term "countable"
is defined in the negative. 149 Income that is not countable includes, among
other things, the first $20 received each month, the first $65 of earned income
each month, half of earned income received over $65, and the value of other
forms of public assistance, such as home energy assistance. or Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) payments.o50 In other words, an
individual who receives more than the aggregate of these amounts plus the
allowed amount will receive no SSI payment at all and will not be eligible for
Medicaid under this standard.IsI
The asset limitations applicable to SSI eligibility are also difficult to
satisfy. To qualify for SSI, an individual must not have more than $2,000 in
resources, and a couple must not have more than $3,000 in resources. 152
Countable resources include cash, assets in bank accounts, stocks and bonds,
real and personal property, life insurance policies, vehicles, and anything that
could be sold for cash. 15 3 Resources owned by an adult's spouse or a child's
parent are also included.1 54 Not all resources are countable, however.
Resources that are exempt include a personal home, household goods and
personal effects, burial spaces, and one motor vehicle.155 In addition, under the
Plan to Achieve Self Support (PASS) program, the Social Security
Administration will allow individuals with disabilities to save money in
furtherance of an employment related goal, such as the purchase of a
computer, without counting the savings against SSI eligibility. 156 Generally
speaking, though, the asset limitations are low.
147 Id
148 d. at 21-22.
149 See id. at 20-21 (listing income items that are not countable).
150Id. at 21.
151 See id. at 20-23.
152 Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 139, at 9.
1 53 Id. at 17.
1541d.
15 5 Id.
156 "PASS lets persons with disabling conditions set aside money for purchases,
installment payments and down payments for things like a vehicle, wheelchair, or a
computer if needed to reach their work goal." Plan to Achieve Self-Support (PASS),
Soc. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.socialsecurity.gov/disabilityresearch/wi/pass.htm [http://
perma.cc/ZGK2-U2D4]. Money set aside through the PASS program will not count
towards SSI eligibility, and if an individual is already SSI eligible then enrolling in the
PASS program will increase the benefits received through SSI. Spotlight on Plan to
Achieve Self-Support, Soc. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.socialsecurity.gov/ssi/spotlights/spot-
plans-self-support.htm [http://perma.cc/5LK3-YBLR]. To enroll in the PASS program, an
individual must (1) state a specific work goal, (2) in writing, (3) with a detailed list of
necessary expenses to achieve the work goal, and (4) a reasonable time frame for the work
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Despite PASS and similar programs, the income and asset limitations
placed on SSI recipients militate against financial security. Individuals with
intellectual or other qualifying disabilities who depend on Medicaid for access
to waiver services are necessarily impoverished under this standard.
Applicable income limitations may complicate work arrangements, and asset
limitations leave these Medicaid recipients exposed to financial shock. For
instance, imagine having only $2,000 to replace the engine in a car or move to
a new apartment. Making the availability of waiver services dependent on this
level of impoverishment makes little sense, particularly when these services
may be necessary for independent living and yet difficult to coordinate and
purchase.
2. Medicaid Eligibility Under the 209(b) Option
A second avenue to Medicaid eligibility, known as the 209(b) option,
allows states to adopt Medicaid eligibility criteria which are more restrictive
than the SSI rules, so long as the criteria chosen are not more restrictive than
those employed by the state in 1972 for medical assistance under the state-
federal welfare program replaced by SSI.157 In order to maintain their forty-
year old income and asset limitations, though, states must offer a spend-down
option.158 Meant to aid the "medically poor," a spend-down option requires a
state to provide Medicaid coverage if an individual's out-of-pocket medical
expenses are greater than the amount by which the individual's income
exceeds the eligibility amount. 159 For example, if a state requires income of
less than $800 per month, and an individual's income is $1,000 each month,
the individual may still qualify for Medicaid if the excess $200 is used for
qualifying medical expenses.
Virginia is one example of a 209(b) state. To receive Medicaid coverage,
an individual with a disability must have income of less than eighty percent of
the federal poverty line160 and must not have "countable resources in excess of
$2,000 for one person or $3,000 for a couple." 61 This income requirement for
Medicaid. eligibility, which is $9,336 in 2014, is even lower than that
employed in SSI determinations.1 62 As a consequence, it restricts access to
15742 C.F.R. § 435.811(d)(2) (2015). According to the Social Security Administration,
there are ten 209(b) states: Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia. See POMS, supra note 135,.at SI
01715.010.
15842 C.F.R. § 435.135(c).
159 Id.
160 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 30-40-220(D) (2010).
161 Va. Dept. of Soc. Servs., Medicaid Fact Sheet #15: Aged, Blind or Disabled
Individuals with Income Less than or Equal to eighty percent of the Federal Poverty Level
(Jan. 2012), http://www.dss.virginia.gov/files/division/bp/medicalassistance/intropage/
covered groups/adultsaged_65/DO32-03-0631-13-eng.pdf [http://perma.cc/HWM4-XARD];
see also 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 30-40-230(B) (2010).
162 Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. 3593 (Jan. 22, 2014).
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waiver services even more severely than the SSI eligibility requirements
would. A medical spend-down provision applies to individuals whose income
exceeds the limit but whose medical expenses soak up the excess income. 163
Again, because of the very low threshold on income and asset holdings,
individuals in 209(b) states must choose between access to waiver services or
financial security and independence from non-disability-related government
programs.
3. Medicaid Eligibility Through Buy-In
In an effort to ameliorate the harsh effect of Medicaid eligibility
requirements on the work-related decisions of individuals with disabilities, the
federal government permits states to create Medicaid buy-in programs for such
individuals who are employed.1 64 Under a Medicaid buy-in program,
individuals with disabilities can pay for access to Medicaid in the same way
that they might pay for private insurance (although private insurers' coverage
of habilitative care is usually limited or nonexistent). 165 Buy-in programs have
been adopted by at least thirty-seven states to date,1 66 and they represent an
important step forward in preserving autonomy and dignity for individuals
with qualifying disabilities. Individuals who qualify for the buy-in may choose
to work without losing access to waiver services.
Buy-in programs are not available to everyone, and the premiums may be
costly. The Balanced Budget Act "[a]llows a state to offer Medicaid coverage
to any employed person with a disability who has a net family income below
250% of the Federal poverty level for a family of the size involved."l 67 In
addition, the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act allows a
state to cover individuals through Medicaid through two separate groups: the
basic coverage and medical improvement groups.1 68 The basic coverage group
allows states to offer Medicaid "to working individuals . . . who, except for
16 3 VA. DEPT. OF SOC. SERVS., VOL. XIII, MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY MANUAL
§MI320.100(a) (May 2015), https://www.dss.virginia.gov/files/division/bp/medical_
assistance/manual transmittals/manual/ml3r.pdf [http://perma.cc/QM53-VY5X].
1 6 4 BOB WILLIAMS ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KEEPING MEDICARE AND MEDICAID




16 6 LAw, HEALTH POLICY & DISABILITY CTR., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO STATE MEDICAID
INFRASTRUCTURE GRANT (MIG) INITIATIVES: MEDICAID BUY-IN PROGRAMS § D.1 (Dec.
2006), http://disability.law.uiowa.edu/lhpdc/rctc/mig/#sectDI [http://perma.cc/8M5Z-
5MUP] (Table of State Medicaid Buy-In Program Implementation and Enrollments).
167 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 164, at 17. For additional explanation, see the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4733, 111 Stat. 251, 522, adding
subclause (XIII) to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii).
168 For additional explanation, see generally WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 164, at 17.
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their income and resource levels, are eligible to receive SSI."l 69 Under basic
coverage, states can establish their own income and resource standards.1 70 For
instance, the State of Illinois allows individuals to buy-in so long as their
countable assets do not exceed $25,000 and their income does not exceed
350% of the federal poverty line.171 For a single individual in 2014, that
amount was $3,404 per month.1 72 Premiums for the buy-in may be as low as
$6 per month or as high as $500 per month depending on the purchaser's
income. 173 In addition to basic coverage, states may provide a medical
improvement buy-in "to employed individuals with a medically improved
disability who lose Medicaid eligibility under the group described above [basic
coverage] because they no longer meet the SSI definition of disability."' 74
This option is important because the SSI definition of disability hinges on an
individual's ability to work.' 75 By definition, someone who is able to "engage
in any substantial gainful activity" does not have a disability for purposes of
SSI, making the medical improvement buy-in an important backstop to the
basic coverage buy-in.1 76
Medicaid buy-in programs are valuable to individuals who must protect
access to waiver services, but they have two serious flaws: they are available
only to individuals who are employed, and asset limitations continue to
apply.1 77 The requirement that an individual be employed before using a buy-
in makes little sense if Congress's purpose in creating the buy-in was to
counteract the harsh effect of Medicaid eligibility requirements on individuals
with intellectual or other significant disabilities. These individuals may have
income from sources other than employment, such as gifts from family and
169Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XV) (2012).
170 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 164, at 17. For an example of basic coverage, see
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5160:1-5-03 (Westlaw through Oct. 2, 2015), describing Ohio's
Medicaid Buy-In for Workers with Disabilities (MBIWD). In Ohio, only income is counted
for eligibility purposes and an individual's countable income must be below 250% of the
federal poverty line. Id. § 5160:1-5-03(D)(1). Illinois permits countable assets of up to
$25,000 and income up to 350% of the federal poverty level. See HBWD Eligibility, supra
note 126.
1 71 HBWD Eligibility, supra note 126.
172 Id
17 3 See HBWD Premium Chart, HEALTH BENEFITS FOR WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES
(HBWD), http://www.hbwdillinois.com/assets/hfsweb004.pdf [http://perma.cc/DL3L-R796].
174 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 164, at 17.
175 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012).
176 Id
177 See Medicaid Employment Initiatives, MEDICAID.GOv, http://www.medicaid.gov/
Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Delivery-Systems/Grant-Programs/
Employment-Initiatives.html [http://perma.cc/BD2Q-F4X9]. For a description of asset
limitations, see LAW, HEALTH POLICY & DISABILTY CTR., A RESOURCE GuIDE TO STATE
MEDICAID INFRASTRUCTURE GRANT (MIG) INTIATIVES: MEDICAID Buy-IN PROGRAMS § D.2
tbl.2 (Dec. 2006), http://disability.law.uiowa.edu/lhpdc/rrtc/mig/#sectD2
[http://perma.cc/Z7FU-8VLT] (Tables of State Medicaid Buy-In Program Design Features). In
2006, the applicable asset restriction could be as low as $999.99 or as high as $75,000. Id.
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friends, or perhaps even investment income. There simply is no empirical
evidence to suggest that individuals with disabilities who are employed are in
greater need of waiver services than those who are not, and requiring
employment as a condition of buy-in wrongly suggests a higher level of
deservedness inherent in those who are able-bodied enough for work. In some
cases, strongly incentivizing work for an individual with a significant
disability may even be economically wasteful and not in keeping with a civil
rights approach to disability law. 178 Denying buy-in access to individuals with
disabilities who cannot work may preclude them from participation solely on
the basis of their disability, which is the source of their exclusion from
community life in the first instance. In effect, the work requirement says, "we
will not help you with inclusion because you have been already excluded."
Even if we accept employment as a criterion for buy-in eligibility, the buy-
in requirement creates inequality on the basis of disability as between workers
who are otherwise similarly situated with the exception of disability. This is
because the medical needs of typically-abled workers are more likely to be
fully covered by private insurance, whereas habilitative services typically are
not. 179 A worker who requires habilitative services already stands at a
disadvantage relative to her able-bodied colleagues, and forcing her to expend
resources for the Medicaid buy-in further exacerbates that inequality. Finally,
imposition of asset holding requirements on access to buy-in programs
prevents individuals with disabilities from saving adequate resources to protect
against financial shock, and it leaves them exposed to loss of waiver services
through receipt of a disqualifying gift or bequest. 80 So while Medicaid buy-in
programs are an improvement over more limited access to waiver services,
they suffer from some of the same normative problems as the eligibility
guidelines themselves.
4. Medicaid Eligibility Under the Affordable Care Act
Implementation of the Affordable Care Act18' has encouraged some states
to increase access to Medicaid, but the expansion does not automatically apply
178 See Weber, supra note 75, at 2507-08.
179 See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 27 (noting that private insurance "fails to cover the
services people with disabilities most need for independence and health").
I 80 See Saving for an Uncertain Future: How the ABLE Act Can Help People with
Disabilities and Their Families: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation & IRS
Oversight of the S. Comm. on Fin., 113th Cong. 33 (2014) [hereinafter ABLE Hearing]
(prepared statement of Sara C. Wolff, Self-Advocate & Board Member, National Down
Syndrome Society (NDSS)) ("Like most individuals with disabilities, people with Down
Syndrome and other conditions are out living their parents. Families, like mine, need to rest
assured that they can equally care for their children and adults with disabilities, just like
they can for their other children and family members.").
181 Thirty states and the District of Columbia implemented the Affordable Care Act
expansion at the beginning of 2015: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland,
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to waiver services for individuals with disabilities. States that adopted the
expansion have opened Medicaid to all adults whose modified adjusted gross
income is up to 138% of the federal poverty line. 182 In 2015, that amount was
$16,242 for a single individual.1 83 Adults with disabilities whose incomes fall
below this threshold amount qualify for Medicaid coverage under the
expansion.1 84 Furthermore, no asset limitation applies.' 85 As a result, a larger
number of adults with disabilities may be covered for routine medical care
under the expansion.
Eligibility under the expansion, however, does not automatically provide
the same suite of benefits as eligibility resulting from disability.1 86 Unless a
state elects otherwise and receives permission from the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), the state must provide a particular suite of
benefits, known as the alternative benefit plan, to individuals that qualify
through the expansion.1 87 Because states must craft the alternative benefit plan
with reference to designated commercial insurance plans, waiver services
typically will not be covered by the Medicaid expansion.1 88 In states that do
not seek HHS approval for an election to deviate from the alternative benefit
plan, individuals with intellectual or other qualifying disabilities who seek
government-coordinated habilitative care still must satisfy the requirements
applicable to eligibility through disability.1 8 9
States may request permission from HHS to offer waiver services to adults
who become eligible for Medicaid through the expansion.1 90 In doing so, the
state must choose whether to add some or all of its waiver programs to the
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. See Status of State Action on the Medicaid
Expansion Decision, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/
state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/ [http://perma.cc/
PPQ5-A8FQ].
18242 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012). The eligibility standard is effectively
138% of the federal poverty line (FPL) even though the ACA expands coverage to 133% of
the FPL because there is a 5% income disregard under the FPL for people applying for
Medicaid based solely on income eligibility. See MUSUMECI, supra note 133, at 7.
183 80 Fed. Reg. 3236-37 (Jan. 22, 2015); MARYBETH MUSUMECI & ROBIN RUDOWITZ,
THE KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, ISSUE BRIEF: THE ACA AND
MEDICAID EXPANSION WAIVERS 1 (Nov. 2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-
the-aca-and-medicaid-expansion-waivers [http://perma.cc/77PH-TEWX].
1 84 See MUSUMECI, supra note 133, at 6.
18542 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14)(C).
1 861d. § 1396a(e)(14)(D)(i).
187 MUSUMECI, supra note 133, at 8. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 440.347(c)); see also Medicaid
and Children's Health Insurance Programs, 78 Fed. Reg. 42,160, 42,200-01 (July 15,
2013).
1 8 8 MUSUMECI, supra note 133, at 8.
I 8 9 Id. at 9.
1 90 1d. (citing Medicaid and Children's Health Insurance Programs, 78 Fed. Reg. at
42,238).
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expansion coverage.191 If the state fully conforms the new alternative coverage
to its original state plan and vice versa, individuals with disabilities may
qualify for waiver services under the Medicaid expansion. 192 If the traditional
state plan and the alternative benefit plan vary, however, an individual's
access to particular services will continue to be governed by that individual's
form of eligibility, and some or all waiver services will be available only to
individuals that meet the state's existing eligibility criteria for coverage of
disability. 193 As of November 2015, of the thirty-one states adopting Medicaid
expansion, only six sought to deviate from the statutorily described program,
and of these, none sought to include HCBS waiver eligibility in their Medicaid
expansion package.1 94
In summary, waiver services may be essential to an individual with a
qualifying disability who wants to live and work in a community, but waivers
are subject to strict income and asset limitations. Although there is some
variance among states, federal law limits the availability of Medicaid-funded
services to only those individuals who live in poverty. This approach might be
unobjectionable if coordinated services were readily available and easily
affordable in the private marketplace, but where this assumption fails,
Medicaid eligibility rules applicable to waiver services fail to live up to
normative goals of promoting autonomy, assisting with integration in the
community to the extent possible and desired, and refraining from the
imposition of norms developed with reference to the typically-abled.
IV. TRUST PLANNING AND THE DELIBERATE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
INDIVIDUALS WITH QUALIFYING DISABILITIES
The strict income and asset limitations embodied in states' Medicaid
eligibility guidelines may lead families to protect a loved one's eligibility
through use of a special needs trust (also sometimes referred to as a Medicaid
protection trust). Recall the example of Thomas. In the absence of trust
planning, he will inherit some or all of his parents' assets upon their death.
Unless his parents are virtually penniless, this inheritance will result in
Thomas's disqualification from Medicaid, causing him to lose access to
habilitative services that he will need to maintain a satisfactory quality of life.
However, the assets inside of a properly structured protection trust are not
counted as assets of the beneficiary for purposes of Medicaid.1 9 5 Three forms
of trust are commonly used, two of which are sanctioned by federal statute: the
191 Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 440.330(d)).
192Id
193 Id.
1 9 4 See MUSUMECI & RUDOWITZ, supra note 183, at 1.195 See Taryn D. Walker, Comment, Congress or the Social Security Administration:
Who Defines a Special Needs Trust?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1055, 1056 (2013) (stating
that funds in a special needs trust are not counted as income or assets of the trust
beneficiary).
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Medicaid payback trust and the pooled trust. 196 With each of these trusts,
families preserve assets for use of a beneficiary with a disability while also
preserving the beneficiary's ability to claim government benefits.1 97
Despite its initial appeal, the Medicaid protection trust is not costless.
Assets protected in trust may not be used to purchase goods or services that are
available through government programs.1 98 As a result, a trust may hold
limitless assets, none of which could be distributed to the beneficiary for basic
costs of living, such as housing, without jeopardizing the beneficiary's access
to Medicaid.1 99 So an individual with a qualifying disability might use trust
funds to vacation in Tahoe every winter but would still be required to qualify
for government food assistance in order to receive waiver services. The
following paragraphs will describe three commonly used protection trusts and
will describe why (in terms more technical than "Tahoe") they are insufficient
to address normative problems and perverse incentives created by means
testing Medicaid's provision of habilitative services.
A. A BriefExplanation ofProtection Trusts
1. Medicaid Payback Trusts
Medicaid payback trusts were created by Congress in 1993 as a means of
protecting individuals with disabilities from government cutbacks in Medicaid
spending. 200 Two kinds are available. 20 1 The first is created for the benefit of a
person with a disability who is under the age of sixty-five and from which "the
State will receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon the death of such
individual up to an amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf
19642 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) (2012) (describing common law supplemental needs
trusts); Joseph A. Rosenberg, Supplemental Needs Trusts for People with Disabilities: The
Development of a Private Trust in the Public Interest, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91, 109
(2000) (describing Medicaid payback and pooled trusts).
197 3 CCH Health Law Editors, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE ¶ 14,311 (2003)
(explaining that special needs and pooled trusts are not counted as resources of the
Medicaid applicant).
1 98 See Rosenberg, supra note 196, at 120-21 (surveying cases and observing that a
trust will not be counted as an available resource for purposes of Medicaid eligibility if it
"clearly expresses the creator's intent to supplement and not to replace government
benefits"). For a state statutory example, see OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5123:1-5-01(C) (Supp.
2015), in which the State of Ohio prohibits the use of trust assets for "basic necessities"
including "essential food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical care."
199 See Rosenberg, supra note 196, at 120-21.
200 See Jacqueline d. Farinella, Come on in, the Water's Fine: Opening up the Special
Needs Pooled Trust to the Eligible Elderly Population, 14 ELDER L.J. 127, 137-38 (2006)
(describing creation of the payback trust as a political compromise meant to satisfy the
conservative push for Medicaid contraction while still serving constituents in the disability
community).
20142 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A)-(B).
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of the individual [by Medicaid]." 202 This form of trust may only be established
by a parent, grandparent, legal guardian of the beneficiary, or a court, using
assets of the beneficiary.203 A second form of payback trust does not suffer
from the same limitation on settlors, but it may receive only pension, Social
Security, or other income of the beneficiary. 204 Again, upon the beneficiary's
death, any trust assets that haven't been spent must be used to repay the state
for Medicaid expenditures of the beneficiary. 205
Legal strictures on the beneficiary's ability to demand trust funds or to use
them for many common expenses limit the usefulness of Medicaid payback
trusts to beneficiaries. Specifically, trust funds may be used only for
supplemental expenses. In Ohio, for instance, supplemental expenses are those
that ordinarily would not be covered by some form of government
assistance.206 In other words, if the beneficiary incurs expenses for which a
government program is available, such as housing or food, trust funds may not
be used to cover the expenses. In fact, the law is even more explicit. It
provides that trust funds may not be used for "basic necessities" including
"essential food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical care." 207 Instead,
funds must be used for expenses not covered by government programs (a
claim denied by Medicaid or habilitative services not available through the
government, for instance), or they may be used for extras such as vacations,
hobbies, cable television, companionship, and cosmetic surgery. 208 The
normative legitimacy of these spending restrictions is truly questionable if
payback trusts are meant to improve the quality of life of individuals with
qualifying disabilities, particularly if one assumes that quality of life depends,
in part, on the satisfaction of an individual's preferences for basic necessities
that may not be included in programs for government assistance. For example,
a beneficiary may prefer, and have trust resources sufficient to obtain,
nonsubsidized housing. So while they are an incredibly important component
of special needs planning, Medicaid payback trusts provide neither sufficient
assurance to worried families nor adult decision-making power to individuals
with disabilities even when those individuals directly earned, through labor,
the funds in the trust. As a result, Medicaid payback trusts are a suboptimal
answer to normative and pragmatic concerns raised by means-tested access to
government-coordinated habilitative care.
2 02 Id. § 1396p(d)(4)(A).
203 Id.
204 Id. § 1396p(d)(4)(B).
205 Id.206 0HIO ADMIN. CODE § 5123:1-5-01(C)(c) (Supp. 2015). For a more thorough
description of the law on supplemental needs trusts, see generally Rosenberg, supra note
196.207 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5123:1-5-01 (C)(1)(b).
208 Id. § 5123:1-5-01(C)(2).
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2. Pooled Trusts
A second form of Medicaid protection trust, the pooled trust, was also
codified in 1993.209 The pooled trust is similar to an ordinary payback trust,
with three prominent distinctions. First, the trust must be administered by a
charitable organization that pools and invests funds for the benefit of persons
with disabilities while maintaining separate accounting for each beneficiary.210
Second, upon the death of the beneficiary, the remaining trust corpus may
either be retained by the charitable organization for the benefit of its mission,
or it may be repaid to the state in an amount equal to the amount of Medicaid
benefits received by the beneficiary. 211 Third, unlike an ordinary payback
trust, a pooled trust may be settled by the beneficiary herself.212
Although this form of trust is somewhat less paternalistic in its conception
of the individual with a disability-she may settle the trust herself and may
choose a charitable remainderman-it is subject to the same spending
restrictions as the Medicaid payback trusts described above.213 As a
consequence, the trust funds cannot be used for food, housing, or basic
medical care even though they may be used for a trip to Disney World or
porcelain veneers on one's teeth.214 While this structure is superior to one in
which an individual with a disability must choose between financial stability
and Medicaid eligibility, it is obviously flawed as a means of achieving
normative goals of autonomy and dignity for individuals with disabilities or as
a means of providing assurance to worried family members.
3. Common Law Discretionary Trusts
Like Medicaid payback trusts and pooled trusts, discretionary trusts (also
known as supplemental needs trusts) are designed to supplement rather than
supplant government benefits provided to the beneficiary who has a
disability.215 Like Medicaid payback trusts, these trusts restrict the trustee
from making distributions of funds to cover basic needs such as food and
housing. 216 Unlike Medicaid payback trusts and pooled trusts, however,
discretionary trusts are not enshrined in federal law. Rather, they are governed
by state law.217 As a result, they need not contain the Medicaid payback





214 See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5123: 2-18-01(C)(2) (Supp. 2015).
215 See JOHN W. NADwORNY & CYNTHIA R. HADDAD, THE SPECIAL NEEDS PLANNING
GUIDE 203 (2007).2 16 Id. at 204.
2 17 See Rosenberg, supra note 196, at 123-30 (surveying state statutes authorizing
supplemental needs trusts).
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provision required by federal statute. Upon the beneficiary's death, the
remainder of trust funds is distributed to remaindermen designated by the
settlor rather than to the government or to the pooled trust administrator.218
A number of states have codified discretionary trust law. Ohio's provision
is typical. By state statute, the trust must be irrevocable, and distributions may
be made "only at the trustee's discretion." 219 Furthermore, the trust may not
include "any standards to guide the trustee in exercising its discretion to make
distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary." 220 As a result, a
discretionary trust must not contain a support standard that would permit a
beneficiary to compel distributions. In addition, state law prohibits
withdrawals by the beneficiary. 221 Finally, to preserve Medicaid eligibility, the
trust must contain "[p]recatory language regarding its intended purpose of
providing supplemental goods and services to or for the benefit of the
beneficiary, and not to supplant benefits from public assistance programs." 222
It also must contain a "prohibition against providing food, clothing, and shelter
to the beneficiary." 223 New York's law also permits the use of such
language,2 24 and Minnesota requires it.22 5
B. Protection Trusts Are Not Enough
In light of the goals of promoting autonomy, assisting integrated living to
the extent desired and practical, and alleviating harm caused by the improper
reliance on norms of the typically-abled in Medicaid eligibility law, protection
trusts are better than nothing. In contrast to a world that permits no asset
protection, the current system provides some measure of autonomy by
providing a source of funding for the discretionary expenses of an individual
with an intellectual or other qualifying disability, who now may choose to eat
out, take a class, go on vacation, or engage in other life-enriching activities. 226
Protection trusts may assist in integrated living by allowing purchases of items
as simple as gifts for friends or as important as adaptive equipment, such as a
2 18Id
2 19 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5801.01(Y)(1)(a)-(b) (West 2007). This language is also
required in California, Illinois, and Wisconsin, among others. See Rosenberg supra note
196, at 125 (describing discretionary trust law in those states).
220 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5801.01(Y)(1)(e).
221 Id
222 Id. § 5801.01(Y)(5)(a).
223 Id. § 5801(Y)(5)(b).
2 24 See Rosenberg, supra note 196, at 124 (describing the language forbidding
distributions for food, clothing, shelter, and medical care used in New York to preserve a
beneficiary's access to government benefits).
225 Id. at 126 (citing MINN. STAT. § 501B.89(2)(d) (2000)).
226Id. at 124-25 (stating that a trust must be settled for intended purpose of providing
supplemental goods and services to or for the benefit of the beneficiary and in some states
must contain a prohibition against providing food and shelter to the beneficiary).
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communication device, not covered by Medicaid.227 In addition, protection
trusts address, to some extent, norms of the able-bodied that are woven into
the Medicaid eligibility requirements. The government's approval of
protection trusts pushes back against the assumption that a person who has the
use of assets does not require public assistance. In addition, by placing assets
beyond the control of the individual with a disability, the protection trust
addresses (albeit in a grossly paternalistic way) the assumption that Medicaid
applicants are fully able to understand and independently comply with the law.
Finally, the protection trust regime formalizes the government's recognition of
the role of family or friend relationships in the life of an individual with a
disability, pushing back on the assumption of a stark dichotomy between
dependent and independent living.
Regardless of the superiority of a protection trust regime to one in which
individuals with disabilities are permitted no asset protection, current law
deviates substantially from a normative account of the provision of
government-coordinated habilitative care to individuals with qualifying
disabilities. Imagine once again the parents of Thomas, the infant with Down
Syndrome. Because of their anticipation that Thomas may require access to
habilitative care as an adult, they create a discretionary trust as part of their
estate plan. The law, in essence, forces them to publicly express a desire to
impoverish their son, requiring him to make claims on food assistance, public
housing, and other government programs. His choices about what to eat, where
to live, and how to get to work all will be limited by this fact. He will be
saddled with the stigma that accompanies life as a comprehensive lifelong
public claimant.228 Furthermore, as an adult, Thomas will be forced to ask
permission from a trustee to use trust funds for discretionary expenses. If he
wants to take a girlfriend out on a special date, purchase a movie collection
that reminds him of his parents, or take a class on photography, he must seek
the assent of another person as if he were still a child. No right-minded
legislator would propose such a regime for children who are typically-abled.
The parent of a typically-abled child may make such a choice, but the
government would never mandate it. The fact that the law is so starkly
different for individuals with significant disabilities indicates an embodiment
in the law of assumptions about the nature of those with disabilities; namely,
that they are childlike. There can be no question that the trust regime, which
allows no support standard, grants absolute discretion to the trustee, and
permits the adult beneficiary no independent judgment in ordinary matters of
adult life, imposes dignitary harms on adults with qualifying disabilities.
2 27 Id.
22 8 See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-
Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARv. L. REv. 533, 565 (1995) ("[S]tigma and social isolation
[are] associated with welfare."); John F. Muller, Disability, Ambivalence, and the Law, 37
AM. J.L. & MED. 469, 513-14 (2011) (stating that direct payments for disability "tend to be
a marker of powerlessness and shame").
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The protection trust regime also fails on normative grounds because it
impinges on autonomy and interferes in interpersonal relationships that have
the potential to improve quality of life. In doing so, it imposes dignitary costs
on individuals with disabilities. Where a protection trust is involved, an
individual with a disability is literally unable to act independently. So while
the use of protection trusts may appear to be autonomy increasing from an
outsider's perspective because trust funds allow a greater variety of personal
expenditures, this may not be the perspective of an individual with a disability.
Although the use of protection trusts may improve autonomy in cases where
the trustee is a trusted friend who is truly guided by the choices of the
individual with a disability, it militates against autonomy in cases where the
trustee deviates from that individual's preferences. Requiring the individual
with a disability to request funds is, almost by definition, the opposite of
autonomy. In addition, if the settlor of the trust is someone other than the
beneficiary, and if that person wants the beneficiary to have some measure of
independence, the settlor's autonomy is also compromised by the current law.
Another failure of the trust regime is that requiring the individual with a
disability to request permission for discretionary expenditures embodies, in
law, a message that the government (as a voice of collective society) does not
believe that the individual is competent to handle his or her own affairs. While
this may be true in some cases, enshrinement of this assumption in federal law
makes little normative sense. Instead, to protect the dignity of individuals with
disabilities, government should work from the premise that these individuals
are competent to handle financial matters and let families, case workers, or
guardians decide when this is not the case. Categorical relegation of
individuals with disabilities on the basis of a characteristic that may not affect
financial sophistication is an unduly restrictive approach.
Yet another problem with the trust regime is that its prohibition on the use
of a support standard imposes uncompensated emotional cost on the family
members of individuals with disabilities. Stated more dryly, the protection
trust regime interferes with interpersonal relationships between the individual
with a disability and anyone who might be willing to provide financial
assistance to that person, once again wrongly assuming, as does the Medicaid
eligibility regime, that independent living is not consistent with interpersonal
dependency. Think again of Thomas's parents and the pain they must have felt
when told that they would not be permitted to support their son in adulthood
without jeopardizing his access to services that would permit him to live in the
community instead of in an institution. Can we truly say that the emotional
cost imposed by the government in this case is justified by the fact of
Thomas's disability?
A final shortcoming of the trust regime is that imposing these costs only
on a subset of individuals with significant disabilities may be conceived of as
discriminatory because it places those individuals in an inferior position on the
basis of their disabilities. To state it colloquially, imagine two children. One is
gullible, or a criminal, or a substance abuser. The other has a developmental
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disability. Both are beneficiaries of trusts settled by loving and concerned
parents. The trust for the child with an addiction will contain a support
standard requiring the trustee to see that the child has adequate shelter,
clothing, and food. The trust for the child with the disability, by law, cannot,
because if it does, the child will lose access to needed habilitative care. This
discrepancy, which arises under law solely as a result of the second child's
disability, makes little sense. There simply is no reasoned connection between
the need for coordinated habilitative care and the ability to pay for one's own
housing and food.
V. THE ABLE ACT: A STEP FORWARD
A. A BriefDescription of the ABLE Act
A better attempt to alleviate the adverse impact of Medicaid eligibility on
individuals with intellectual or other qualifying disabilities is the Achieving a
Better Life Experience Act, generally referred to as the ABLE Act.229 The
ABLE Act creates a tax-preferred savings account under newly enacted
section 529A of the Internal Revenue Code, similar to a college savings
account.230 ABLE accounts may be created by the account beneficiary, or by
the parent or legal guardian of a beneficiary who lacks capacity, and the
account beneficiary must have a qualifying disability.23 1 Anyone can
contribute to the account, so long as the contributions are made in cash or a
cash equivalent. 232 Contributions to the account, investment earnings inside of
the account, and funds distributed for "qualified disability expenses" will not
count against eligibility for means-tested federal programs, including
Medicaid, except that distributions for housing expenses and account balances
above $100,000 will reduce the beneficiary's supplemental security income
229 See ABLE Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, 128 Stat. 4056 (codified at I.R.C.
§§ 529A, 3511, 7705 (West Supp. 2015)).230 I.R.C. § 529A. For a'description of college savings accounts, see Kerry A. Ryan,
Access Assured: Restoring Progressivity in the Tax and Spending Programs for Higher
Education, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 25 (2008).
231 I.R.C. § 529A(e)(1) (stating that an individual is eligible to be an ABLE beneficiary
if "(A) the individual is entitled to benefits based on blindness or disability under title II or
XVI of the Social Security Act, and such blindness or disability occurred before the date on
which the individual attained age 26, or (B) a disability certification with respect to such
individual is filed with the Secretary for such taxable year"); id. § 529A(e)(6) (requiring an
account to be established by an eligible individual); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529A-2(c)(1), 80
Fed. Reg. 35,602, 35,613 (June 22, 2015) (clarifying that a parent or legal guardian may
establish and take actions with regard to an ABLE account for the benefit of a beneficiary
who lacks capacity). Proposed regulations provide a default rule requiring annual
redetermination of eligibility, but they allow states to choose their own recertification
periods based on type of disability. Id. § 1.529A-2(d).
232 I.R.C. § 529A(b)(2) (not limiting source of contribution but specifying cash
equivalency).
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(SSI) payment, if any. 233 Each beneficiary may have only one account. 234 Like
college savings accounts, ABLE accounts are subject to an aggregate
contribution limit pegged, strangely, to the cost of college tuition rather than
any projection of the beneficiary's disability-related expenses. 235 In addition,
yearly contributions to the account cannot exceed the annual gift tax
exemption, 236 which is $14,000 in 2015.237 Again, this amount bears no
relation to an individual's estimated yearly expenses, disability related or
otherwise.
Funds in an ABLE account may be used for "qualified disability
expenses" without jeopardizing a beneficiary's Medicaid eligibility.23 8 The
definition of "qualified disability expenses" is broad and includes many of the
everyday expenses that mark passage into adulthood, such as housing,
transportation, and medical insurance. 239 Specifically, the law provides that
"qualified disability expenses" are expenses made for the benefit of an
individual that are related to the individual's disability. 240 The law provides
several categories of qualified expenses: education; housing; transportation;
employment training and support; assistive technology and personal support
services; health, prevention, and wellness; financial management and
administrative services; legal fees; expenses for oversight and monitoring;
funeral and burial expenses; and other expenses that are approved by the
Secretary of the Treasury.24 1 Proposed regulations issued in June of 2015
clarify that basic living expenses may be treated as qualified disability
expenses. 242 For example, the cost of a smart phone with navigation features is
disability related. 243 Funds that remain unused at the end of the beneficiary's
life are transferred to the state to reimburse it for assistance provided to the
2 33 ABLE Act of 2014 § 103, 128 Stat. at 4063. Funds in excess of $100,000 would not
terminate a beneficiary's eligibility for SSI; rather, excess funding would suspend the
beneficiary's collection of SSI benefits. Id. This suspension would not affect Medicaid
eligibility in states where SSI eligibility is a prerequisite for Medicaid eligibility. Id.234 1.R.C. § 529A(b)(1)(B),
235 Id. § 529A(b). For purposes of this limitation, rollovers or program-to-program
transfers from another qualified ABLE account are treated as contributions. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.529A-2(g), 80 Fed. Reg. at 35,614.
236 1.R.C. § 529A(b)(6). Rollovers or program-to-program transfers from another
qualified ABLE account are not treated as contributions for purposes of applying this
limitation. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529A-2(g).
23 7 See Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860.
238 I.R.C. § 529A(c)(1)(B) (describing tax treatment of distributions for qualified
disability expenses); ABLE Act of 2014 § 103, 128 Stat. at 4063 (describing relationship
between ABLE accounts and eligibility for federal benefits programs).
239 I.R.C. § 529A(e)(5).
240 Id
241 Id. § 529A(b).
242 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529A-2(h)(1), 80 Fed. Reg. 35,602, 35,614-15 (June 22,
2015).24 3 Id. § 1.529A-2(h)(2).
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beneficiary through Medicaid, but only up to the amount of that assistance. 244
This provision mirrors the Medicaid payback requirement found in some
special needs trusts.245
In addition to preserving a beneficiary's eligibility for Medicaid and other
programs, ABLE accounts subsidize qualified disability expenses through tax
preference. ABLE account contributions and distributions receive preferential
gift tax treatment. 246 In addition, distributions for qualified disability expenses
are not subject to federal income tax.247 On the other hand, distributions to a
beneficiary for nonqualified expenses do not receive any income tax
preference. 248 Instead, they are taxed as annuity payments at a rate that is ten
percent higher than the beneficiary's usual rate. 249
Overall, the ABLE Act provides individuals with disabilities the
opportunity to save money for necessary costs of adult living without
jeopardizing access to the very disability-related services that they require for
integration into the community. The ability to save, though, is hampered by
yearly and aggregate contribution limits that unnecessarily limit the usefulness
of ABLE accounts. In other words, the Act provides some relief, but that relief
is incomplete.
1. The ABLE Act: A Long Awaited (Partial) Solution
The ABLE Act is normatively superior to the protection trust regime
because it both increases autonomy and facilitates integrated living when it is
desired and possible. First, and foremost, an individual with a disability who
places funds in an ABLE account is not required to relinquish control over
those funds but can withdraw them (subject to a tax penalty) if needed.250 This
ability to reclaim funds differs markedly from the special needs trust regime,
which requires beneficiaries to completely relinquish any claim or control over
contributions, even if those contributions come from a beneficiary's own wage
income. 251 Second, unlike assets held in a special needs trust, assets held in an
ABLE account may be used for ordinary costs of living such as housing,
insurance, and transportation. 252 As a result, the beneficiary of an ABLE
account is not constrained in his or her choices by restrictions and stigma that
may be attached to government programs. In addition, it may be possible for
an account owner or beneficiary to arrange direct payment to providers in a
manner similar to college tuition, which would require the beneficiary to seek
244 I.R.C. § 529A(f).
2 4 5 See supra Part W.A. 1.246 1.R.C. § 529A(c)(2).
247 Id. § 529A(c)(1)(B).
248 Id. § 529A(c)(1)(A).
249 Id. § 529A(c)(1)(A), (c)(3).
250 d. (describing tax and ten percent penalty on non-disability-related distributions).
25 1 See supra Part IV.A.1.
252 1.R.C. § 529A(e)(5).
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permission fewer times and from fewer people.253 Under law, there is a tax
penalty on disbursements made for nonqualified expenses, and nonqualified
expenditures will count against the income and asset limitations of Medicaid,
but enactment of the tax penalty makes it clear that a beneficiary may use the
funds for nonqualifying expenditures. Broader permissible use of the funds
and easier access to them will allow individuals with disabilities to more easily
use funds in the way best suited to their individual needs and tastes.
Another benefit of the ABLE account is that it can provide a form of
income smoothing for Medicaid eligibility purposes when individuals with
disabilities have earnings that follow a feast or famine model. The ability to
remain eligible for benefits rather than drifting in and out of the system is
important. Qualification for waiver services requires paperwork and often
placement on a waiting list.254 Someone who is employable only in spurts may
suffer from repeated disqualification from Medicaid and, therefore, also suffer
from repeated application processes and waiting times. By allowing
individuals with disabilities to save earnings and then use them over time for
qualified expenses, ABLE accounts can provide income smoothing that will
prevent repeated losses of Medicaid eligibility. 255 This should forward
integration and autonomy by preventing the disruption of an individual's
waiver services.
In addition to forwarding traditional integrationist goals of autonomy and
integration, the ABLE Act also addresses redistributive concerns raised by
Francine Lipman and others by providing financial support in the form of a tax
expenditure. 256 Investment earnings inside of an ABLE account are exempt
253 Many plans allow direct payments or online requests. For instance, Iowa has an
online claim request process. See Withdrawals, C. SAVINGS IOWA,
https://collegesavingsiowa.com/content/withdrawals.html [https://perma.cc/B466-JXGS];
see also FAQ: PA 529 Guaranteed Savings Plan, PA529, http://www.pa529.com/faqs/pa-
529-guaranteed-savings-plan/account-access [http://perma.cc/24AU-CRUQ]; How to Take
Money Out of Your Direct Plan Account, NY's 529 C. SAVINGS PROGRAM,
https://www.nysaves.org/content/planbenefitswithdrawals.html [https://perma.cc/Q2KU-
C2NH].
254 For a fifty-state chart on the length of waiver waitlists, see Waiting List Enrollment
for Medicaid Section 1915(c) Home and Community-Based Services Waivers, KAISER FAM.
FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/waiting-lists-for-hcbs-waivers/ [http://
perma.cc/JM2N-JEVW].
255 The proposed regulations provide additional protection for individuals whose
disability is sporadic. Proposed Treasury Regulation section 1.529A-2(d)(3) provides that
an account will retain ABLE status even though an individual's disability has ceased. 80
Fed. Reg. 35,602, 35,613 (June 22, 2015). The account can accept no contributions during
the cessation, and distributions made during that time are not made for qualified disability
expenses. Id.
256 See Lipman, supra note 26, at 410 (arguing that post-integrationism calls for more
aggressive redistribution of resources to individuals with disabilities). Under the traditional
definition crafted by Stanley Surrey, tax expenditures are provisions that take the place of
direct government spending and that deviate from generally accepted definitions of net
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from federal income taxation unless and until they are distributed for
nonqualified expenses or to a nonqualified beneficiary, and this foregone
federal revenue will provide beneficiaries with additional money to spend on
disability-related expenses.257 This is precisely the sort of cost-shifting
envisioned by some post-integration disability law theorists. 258 In addition, the
ABLE Act moves away from a false dichotomy between dependent and
independent living by interfering to a lesser degree with interpersonal financial
relationships, and in doing so, it unwinds (to the extent of the contribution cap)
perverse family financial and work planning incentives created by means
testing. Returning to Thomas's parents, there will be less reason to move
assets into a special needs trust if they can instead be placed in an ABLE
account, where they may be used to cover Thomas's groceries, rent, and other
expenses that cannot be covered through use of a special needs trust.259 ABLE
accounts funded by family members and friends of individuals with disabilities
will bring interpersonal financial relationships of individuals with disabilities
closer to those experienced by their typically-abled counterparts. Accounts
funded by individuals with disabilities from their own earnings will increase
autonomy and self-direction.260
Use of the accounts also should vitiate, to some extent, the waning yet
widespread stereotype of individuals with waiver-qualifying disabilities as
financial (or actual) wards of the state. This mischaracterization, which is
embodied in the Medicaid eligibility requirements, forces individuals with
disabilities to enter into a fuller relationship of dependence with the state than
may be necessary. Stated more colloquially, typically-abled individuals in
need of assistance may commonly look first to friends and family, and only
when that fails, to the state. Means testing as a bar to access for disability-
related services prevents individuals with disabilities from benefitting from
income. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 3 (1973). They may include
exemptions, deductions, credits, and exclusions. Id.
257 I.R.C. § 529A(a), (c) (accounts are exempt from tax; nonqualified distributions are
subject to tax and a penalty).258 See Weber, supra note 26, at 891 ("[Post-integration theorists] have written of new
ideas of social justice that take into account the realities of disability-for example, the
inevitable costs that disability imposes on the individual by reducing earning capacity and
increasing necessary expenses. They have proposed shifting those costs onto society as a
whole." (footnote omitted)).
259 See I.R.C. § 529A(e)(5) (description of disability related expenses). In addition,
distributions from the account could be used to for transportation expenses such as to
purchase a vehicle, make necessary modifications to it, or to cover the cost of other options
such as mass transit or a taxi. Id. Distributions from the account could also cover the cost
of financial management, legal fees, personal assistance, job training, education, and
funeral expenses. Id.
2 60 See ABLE Hearing, supra note 180, at 31 (prepared statement of Chase A. Phillips,
Financial Advisor and Advocate) ("This account will serve as a self-sufficient booster for
disabled individuals to live independently, go to college, get married, and start a family. No
longer would an individual have to decline a higher paying salary for fear that their assets
would eclipse the $2,000 asset limit.").
2015] 1297
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
similar relational dependence. Placing an artificial barrier between individuals
with disabilities and their loved ones likely affects not only the transfer of
funds but also the emotional health of the parties involved, imposing
intangible costs on both the individual with a disability and those who want to
assist him. But there seems to be no logical connection between imposition of
this cost and the presence of a disability. The presence of a disability does not
provide a line of demarcation that would justify government intrusion into
preferred relationships of dependency. Rather, both avenues of resort-support
of a social and familial network and support of the government-should be
equally available, just as they are equally available to typically-abled
individuals. The ABLE Act allows family and friends to contribute and allows
beneficiaries to use those contributions for everyday expenses of adult life. As
such, it is an improvement over the special needs trust regime because it
recognizes and does not delegitimize natural relationships of dependency and
support.26 1
Of equal importance, the ABLE Act preserves dignity and improves
employment opportunities of individuals with qualifying disabilities. Prior to
passage of the ABLE Act, individuals with disabilities had three choices if
their potential earnings would bar them from receiving waiver services. First,
they could forego government-provided services in favor of private ones. This
may be a viable option for some people, but for many, many others,
government coordination of services is important. 262 In addition, private
services are difficult to obtain,263 are unaffordable, 264 and typically are not
covered by private health insurance. 265 Second, a person whose income was
above the Medicaid limit could contribute her excess earnings to a Medicaid
payback trust. This option is suboptimal because the individual must cede
complete control of her earnings to a trustee vested with absolute discretion.266
261 See I.R.C. § 529A(b) (no restrictions on identity of account contributors); id.
§ 529A(e)(5) (description of disability-related expenses).
262 Case managers, who are typically not available with privately purchased care,
assess an individual's needs, develop a plan for meeting those needs, coordinate care
among multiple providers, link individuals with disabilities to other relevant federal and
state programs, monitor the delivery of care and address problems with it, and responds to
crisis situations. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (CMS), APPLICATION FOR A
§ 1915(c) HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED WAIVER: INSTRUCTIONS, TECHNICAL GUIDE AND
REVIEW CRITERIA 113-14, 141-42 (Ver. 3.5, Jan. 2015) [hereinafter HCBS
INSTRUCTIONS], http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/
waivers/downloads/technical-guidance.pdf [http://perma.cc/7SCH-344L] (stating that
coordinating care enables the state to set the standard for training and maintain a high level
of care from all providers).
2632010 FINDS SURVEY, supra note 86, at iv (finding that more than 80% of families
had difficulty finding care providers).
264 Id. at 24 (finding that 80% of families reported having insufficient funds to cover
the costs of care).
265Id. at 12 (finding that only 8% of families reported private insurance coverage of
costs of care paid to unrelated parties).266 See supra Part IV.A. (describing Medicaid protection trusts).
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The trustee could choose never to make a distribution, and the beneficiary
whose earnings are tied up would have no legal recourse. Furthermore, money
in the trust cannot be used for important expenses of adult living like food and
rent. Finally, an individual with earnings potential in excess of the Medicaid
limit may decide to work fewer hours in order to preserve eligibility for
disability-related services. 267 For example, consider testimony before the
Senate Finance Committee of Sara Wolff, a woman who happens to have
Down Syndrome:
Currently, I cannot have more than two-thousand dollars in assets before
the government aid that I need is cut off. In this day and age, two-thousand
dollars is not a lot of money and with the rising costs of housing,
transportation and medical assistance that I need, it is tough for me to be able
to save. I currently work two part-time jobs, and my employers have been
gracious enough to work with me so I do not earn more than seven-hundred
dollars a month; and maintain my government benefits. 26 8
Because employers may be unwilling to enter into very limited part-time
arrangements and would prefer to hire individuals who have fewer scheduling
restrictions, the Medicaid income and asset limitations may unduly limit
employment opportunities for individuals who need government-coordinated
habilitative care. Passage of the ABLE Act should alleviate this problem to an
extent (although contribution caps make it a less-than-perfect fix).
The ABLE Act is, however, an incomplete solution. Like special needs
trusts, it relies on private actors for its implementation, and not all individuals
with disabilities will have either the capability or the outside assistance needed
to access the law. It also requires segregation of finances under special rules
that disempower beneficiaries with disabilities. In addition, contributions to
the account are limited, which means that its ability to address perverse
incentives created by current law is similarly limited. Furthermore,
contribution limitations applicable to ABLE accounts seemingly bear no
relationship to an individual's projected or actual disability-related expenses.
So while the ABLE Act is a clear improvement over prior law, it is not
normatively optimal. Congress and the states should take the next step and
eliminate the means testing for waiver services.
2. Normative Weaknesses of the ABLE Act
There are three substantive problems with the ABLE Act. One of them-
its contribution limit-is more pragmatic in nature, while the other two-lack
of access for lower income or financially unsophisticated families and lack of
self-administration by the individual with a disability-raise normative
267 ABLE Hearing, supra note 180, at 34 (prepared statement of Sara C. Wolff, Self-
Advocate & Board Member, National Down Syndrome Society (NDSS)).268 Id. (emphasis added).
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concerns about the equitable distribution of resources in society and about
dignity of the person. This is not to say that the ABLE Act is not, at the very
least, a partial solution to the problems raised by means testing. Rather, the
ABLE Act is a good start, but it is incomplete. Congress should go further.
a. Contribution Limits Measured by College Tuition Make No Sense In
this Context
The first and most obvious flaw of the ABLE account is that its
contribution limits bear no relationship to the actual qualified disability
expenses that an individual might incur. Artificially low contribution limits
may prevent account beneficiaries from fully covering disability-related
expenses using account funds, may prevent them from saving for retirement,
and may prevent families from contributing to support in ways that could
lessen a beneficiary's dependence on non-disability-related government
programs. And while Congress may have imposed contribution limits to
control the amount of tax benefit provided under the act, it could have chosen
to cap the tax benefit directly rather than limiting contributions to the account.
Two contribution limits apply to ABLE accounts. First, yearly
contributions to the account may not exceed the gift tax exemption amount in
effect under Internal Revenue Code section 2503(b) for any given year.269 in
2015, that amount is $14,000.270 This amount bears no relationship to an
individual's projected or actual qualified disability expenses. In many cities,
the account beneficiary might spend close to this amount on rent alone.
Because the amount is artificially low, it will prevent individuals with
disabilities who may be capable of saving for disability-related expenses in
retirement from actually doing so. Not only might this result in financial
insecurity and dignitary harm to the account beneficiary, but it almost
guarantees that the account beneficiary will be a claimant of government
programs in retirement. Congress appears not to have considered these costs
when choosing the gift tax exemption amount as an annual contribution cap. In
fact, its choice demonstrates that gifts, and not earned income, were of primary
concern when writing this portion of the legislation. Otherwise, it would have
chosen some combination of estimated and/or actual disability-related
expenses.
The $14,000 limitation also makes no sense in the context of contributions
from family members and friends. Not only is it unrelated to any reasonable
estimate of disability-related expenses, but it also precludes testamentary
transfers. Imagine again Thomas's family, but in a scenario where their assets
are illiquid. They have a house and vehicles. When they die, these assets could
be sold and the proceeds used to cover Thomas's disability-related expenses,
including housing, transportation, and food. Doing so would lessen his
269 ABLE Act of 2014, I.R.C. § 529A(b)(2) (West Supp. 2015).
270 Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860.
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dependence on related government programs and give his parents the
satisfaction of knowing that they had provided for him, at least in part. Instead,
the ABLE Act prohibits a lump sum contribution, so Thomas's parents will
direct the money to a special needs trust instead. The special needs trust will
limit use of the funds to discretionary expenses not otherwise covered by the
government. Thomas will be able to use the bequest to buy movie tickets and
haircuts, but he will not be able to use it for rent. This problem could be easily
solved by allowing testamentary transfers to ABLE accounts, a quick fix with
low potential for abuse.
In addition to imposing a yearly contribution limit, the ABLE Act also
imposes an aggregate contribution limit. It specifies that contributions over the
life of the account cannot exceed "the limit established by the State under
section 529(b)(6)." 271 Under section 529, which describes college savings
accounts, states must provide "adequate safeguards to prevent contributions on
behalf of a designated beneficiary in excess of those necessary to provide for
the qualified higher education expenses of the beneficiary." 272 Consequently,
states have set contribution limits based on the costs of tuition, room and
board, books, and other educational expenses.273 In addition, the Treasury
Regulations provide a safe harbor contribution amount based on "five years of
undergraduate enrollment at the highest cost institution allowed by the
program." 274 There is no reason to believe that this amount will bear any
relationship to the amount of money needed to support the lifetime "qualified
disability expenses" of an ABLE account beneficiary.
Congress could easily correct the discrepancy between its seemingly
random contribution limit and the amount of qualified disability expenses that
an individual might incur over a lifetime. For instance, Congress could amend
section 529A to allow contributions up to the amount of disability-related
distributions during the year plus an amount deemed reasonable for retirement
savings, like the tax-preferred IRA contribution limit in effect for the year.
Amending the law in this way would allow individuals with disabilities to
cover more expenses from their own wages while still allowing them to save
for those expenses in retirement. Alternatively, and perhaps more easily
implemented, Congress could simply remove contribution limits and cap the
available tax benefit instead.
An aggregate contribution limit pegged to the cost of education raises a
second very troubling problem. Congress seems to have assumed that ABLE
271 See I.R.C. § 529A(b)(6).
272Id. § 529(b)(6).
273 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200134032 (May 30, 2001) (approving maximum
contribution limit of four years of undergraduate and three years of "graduate school
tuition, fees, books, supplies, and room and board at the most expensive graduate school
eligible for the program"); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200030030 (Apr. 28, 2000) (approving
maximum contribution of the lesser of seven years of average undergraduate tuition, fees,
room and board or the cost of a beneficiary's anticipated higher education expenses).
274 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-2(i)(2), 63 Fed. Reg. 45,019, 45,028 (Aug. 24, 1998).
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account beneficiaries will not have both disability related expenses and
qualified education expenses. Consider, for instance, Jane and Joe. Jane is
typically-abled, but Joe happens to have a waiver-qualifying disability arising
from cerebral palsy. As a result, he could benefit from disability-related
services. Both are the owners of fully funded tax-preferred savings accounts,
and both choose to attend the same private college. Both completely exhaust
their account balance on tuition and other educational expenses. Jane's
account is a college savings account under section 529, but Joe's is an ABLE
account under section 529A. (He cannot own a regular 529 college savings
account because they are countable resources for purposes of determining
Medicaid eligibility.) 275 While Jane will need no extraordinary assistance to
enter the workforce and participate independently in her community, Joe will
require monetary and habilitative support to remain independent.
Unfortunately, the balance of his ABLE account will have been exhausted;
means testing of Medicaid eligibility will prevent him from seeking a fair
wage; and his family will be unable to assist him further without jeopardizing
his access to habilitative care through Medicaid.
One possible explanation for the disparate treatment of Jane and Joe
centers on misplaced concerns about horizontal equity-the idea that similarly
situated taxpayers should bear and receive similar portions of the burdens and
benefits of government. 276 Applying college savings account contribution
limits to ABLE accounts might be seen as an attempt to create parity between
individuals with disabilities and those without. Individuals with disabilities,
the argument may run, are currently at a disadvantage because they cannot
create savings accounts for their future benefit without jeopardizing their
Medicaid status. In other words, the law provides a financial advantage to Jane
that is not currently provided to Joe, making his position subordinate to hers
purely on the basis of his disability. To cure this slight, the ABLE Act grants
to Joe the same benefit that is granted to Jane. Using this logic, the same
contribution limit should apply to both forms of tax-preferred savings.
A parity-based argument in support of contribution limits is misguided in
this context, though, because the two groups of beneficiaries are not similarly
situated. Jane will not need lifelong access to habilitative care, while Joe will.
To create true parity, Congress could simply have provided that a college
savings account would not be considered an asset of its owner for Medicaid
purposes (and, in the author's opinion, it should do so). Jane and Joe could
then pay for their own college expenses on equal terms. But this would not
achieve the goal of the ABLE Act. The purpose of the ABLE account is
entirely different from the purpose of the college savings account. The stated
purpose of the ABLE Act is "supporting individuals with disabilities to
2 75 POMS, supra note 135, at SI 01140.150 (Oct. 2009), http://policy.ssa.gov/
poms.nsf/lnx/0501140150 [https://perma.cc/5U6V-K2X6].2 7 6 See JOEL SLEMROD & JOHN BAKUA, TAxING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 59-60 (4th ed. 2008) (defining vertical and horizontal equity for
purposes of tax policy).
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maintain health, independence, and quality of life." 27 7 The legislation clarifies
that it is meant to "supplement, but not supplant," benefits provided by the
government. 278 In other words, it is meant to facilitate private support of
individuals with disabilities without jeopardizing their access to Medicaid. .In
contrast, the college savings account was created to help families pay tuition.
It is clear that the two accounts forward different goals. As a result, the
concept of horizontal equity is inapposite as a justification for the ABLE
account contribution limit.
Congress should carve college savings accounts out of the Medicaid
eligibility calculation. The example of Jane and Joe demonstrates that as a
result of embodiment of the longstanding norm of exclusion of individuals
with qualifying disabilities from higher education, Joe's position is
subordinate to Jane's. But this norm is giving way to the reality of increased
educational opportunities for individuals with intellectual and developmental
disabilities, 279 and in the recent FINDS survey, over fifty-eight percent of
family caregivers reported that it was very important for their loved ones with
intellectual or developmental disabilities to continue their education after high
school. 280 To create true parity, Joe should be permitted ownership of both the
college savings account and the ABLE account without jeopardizing his
access to waiver services.
The disparate treatment of Jane and Joe is perhaps mitigated by the fact
that although Joe cannot own a college savings account, he can be the
beneficiary of one. 281 Of course, his potential status as a beneficiary of a
college savings account makes Congress's choice of the section 529 aggregate
account limitation even more bizarre. Finally, notice the dignitary harm
present here. Joe can benefit from a college saving account, but only if he does
not create or own it. Because Joe has a disability, the law forces him to trade
ownership and control (i.e., self-determination and independence) for the very
services that he needs to remain independent in the community.
A second possible justification for aggregate and annual contribution
limits may be Congress's desire to avoid tax sheltering. Although
contributions to ABLE accounts are not federally deductible, investment
earnings inside of the account are exempt from tax.282 Distributions for
277 See ABLE Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, § 101, 128 Stat. 4056, 4056 (codified
at I.R.C. § 529A (West Supp. 2015)) (statement of legislative purpose).
278 Id
279 See, e.g., Find a College, THINK COLLEGE!, http://www.thinkcollege.net/
component/programsdatabase/?view-programsdatabase&Itemid=339 [http://perma.cc/3R5V-
QUA6] (containing a database of 227 college programs available to students with
intellectual disabilities).
2802010 FINDS SuRVEY, supra note 86, at 7.
281 See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
282 See I.R.C. § 529A(a) (qualifying ABLE programs are exempt from federal income
tax).
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qualified disability expenses are also exempt. 283 In addition, the owner of the
account may change the beneficiary designation without incurring any tax if
the new beneficiary is a member of the original beneficiary's family who also
has a qualifying disability. 284 If contributions to ABLE accounts were
unlimited, permissive tax treatment might enable wealthy families to shelter
investment earnings from tax, allowing them to accumulate in the ABLE
account for the duration of the beneficiary's life. This problem could be solved
easily, though, by capping the maximum tax benefit available in a year or over
the lifetime of the account rather than by capping contributions. Furthermore,
the presence of Medicaid payback language in the ABLE Act is likely to
discourage families from contributing more money to an ABLE account than a
beneficiary might actually use. Because the potential for sheltering is low and
easily dealt with in other ways, Congress should repeal the annual and
aggregate contribution limits currently applicable to ABLE accounts.
b. Placing the ABLE Account in the Internal Revenue Code Restricts
Access but May Produce Structural Gains.
A second problem with the ABLE account-its inclusion in the Internal
Revenue Code-raises normative concerns about equity and equal access.
First, limiting availability of benefits to taxpayers who are able to save (i.e.,
have disposable income) creates disparities across socioeconomic strata.
Beneficiaries who are able to save more will have more untaxed investment
earnings inside of their ABLE accounts. Greater earnings will provide them
with both greater tax benefit and greater purchasing power. And it is likely that
beneficiaries who are able to save more are either more able-bodied and
therefore able to earn higher wages than their low-savings counterparts, or,
alternatively, they come from wealthier families than their low-savings
counterparts.
Those with low or no income may realize little or no benefit from the
ABLE Act due to a combination of lower marginal tax rates and income
uncertainty, whereas those at higher levels will benefit from both tax
subsidization and easier access to waiver services. Deborah Schenk and
Andrew Grossman have demonstrated that "[a]s with the other tax incentives,
taxpayers with no tax liability cannot benefit from the use of a 529."285 In
addition, they observe that the return on savings in a 529 account must
compete not only with other reasons for saving, "such as for a house or car,
but also must compete with day-to-day consumption. The utility from savings
simply cannot compete with the utility from essential expenditures." 286 This is
also true in the ABLE Act context. Families who earn no more than is needed
283 Id. § 529A(c) (distributions for qualified disability expenses are not subject to tax).
284Id. § 529A(c)(1)(C)(ii).
285 Deborah H. Schenk & Andrew L. Grossman, The Failure of Tax Incentives for
Education, 61 TAX L. REv. 295, 350 (2008).
286Id. at 350-51.
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to cover essential expenses will be excluded from participation in the ABLE
structure and instead will have to rely on estate planning options such as
special needs trusts to protect Medicaid eligibility of heirs who are individuals
with disabilities.
Inclusion of the ABLE Act in the Internal Revenue Code may also create
complexity that could bar access by less sophisticated taxpayers. As Anne
Alstott has noted with regard to the earned income tax credit, "the traditional
tax policy goal of exempting the poor from income taxation" not only means
that families at low income will realize no tax benefit but also will be less
likely to participate overall. 287 Lower participation may occur in the context of
the ABLE Act because a taxpayer may be reticent to work with a bank, may be
reluctant to place money under even nominal state control, may not know
about the ABLE Act or be able to understand it, or simply may lack disposable
income.
Some commentators also have suggested that moving social safety net
programs into the Internal Revenue Code may reduce aggregate complexity by
shifting them into a more efficient wing of the overall bureaucracy, but this
argument is inapposite in the case of the ABLE Act, which layers a new
program on top of an existing one.288 In other words, an ABLE Act
beneficiary cannot avoid the state's Medicaid administration bureaucracy
through use of the account. The beneficiary still must apply and be approved
for Medicaid in order to receive waiver services (although perhaps he will
experience some bureaucratic relief through avoidance of other welfare-related
agencies if he substitutes ABLE account funds for government benefits such
as housing assistance).
It is possible, though, that concerns about inclusion of the ABLE Act in
the Internal Revenue Code are offset by gains that may accompany the
enactment of nontax provisions in the tax code. For instance, Susannah Camic
Tahk has noted that provisions are easier to enact if they are included in the
tax code because lower procedural hurdles apply to tax legislation. 289 In
addition, "tax-embedded programs are situated in a web of tax law that makes
them hard to excise cleanly." 290 As a result, they are less likely to be repealed
than programs that may be legislated in a more free-standing fashion.291 Social
287 Alstott, supra note 228, at 585 (stating that participation may be lower because "the
poor typically do not have to file tax returns").288 See id. at 565 (suggesting that tax-based transfers may be more efficient because
"[w]elfare administration is labor-intensive, expensive, and heavily dependent on 'street-
level' bureaucrats"); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 958 (2004) ("Putting a program into the tax
system makes the tax system look more complicated, but there is unseen simplification
elsewhere.").
289 See Susannah Camic Tahk, Everything Is Tax: Evaluating the Structural
Transformation of US. Policymaking, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 81-92 (2013) (describing
the relative ease of procedures applicable to tax legislation).290 1d. at 88.
29 1Id at 90 n.157.
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programs housed in the tax code also expand and contract automatically over
time as the number of claimants filing returns waxes and wanes. 292 In contrast,
direct spending programs generally require Congressional action for
expansion. 293
Benefits may also arise from redundancy. 294 Nancy Staudt has observed
that "[r]edundancy in effort and control can provide a measure of reliability in
the face of uncertainty." 295 In addition, redundancy may spark competition and
innovation among administrators. 296 This certainly may be the case with
regard to the ABLE Act, which allows the Internal Revenue Service to
determine which expenses are qualified disability expenses, perhaps in
contravention to the determination of some states as to whether assets or
services purchased for an individual with a disability may constitute countable
income or assets.
In the end, while there are legitimate arguments in favor of crafting the
ABLE Act as a tax provision, it would be normatively superior to simply
eliminate means testing as a bar to accessing government-coordinated
habilitative care. Elimination of means-tested access to waiver services would
eliminate the need for redundancy in income and asset determinations for
some claimants, as these would no longer be relevant to eligibility. Second, it
would eliminate distributional concerns raised by the ABLE Act's status as a
tax expenditure for families with disposable incomes. Although some may
argue that granting non-means-tested waivers would create a second
distributional concern by unduly redistributing to the wealthy, that argument is
normatively and pragmatically unfounded. If we assume, realistically, that
wealthier families of individuals with disabilities will successfully shelter
assets with or without an ABLE account (in other words, because they have
access to sophisticated legal counsel, individuals with disabilities from
wealthy backgrounds will always qualify for waiver services), removal of
means testing will not directly affect the overall distribution of waiver
resources. The number of wealthy claimants will not change. For them, the
question is not whether they will have access, but whether the government will
continue to demand dignitary and emotional sacrifices as the cost of access.
So, to summarize, the ABLE Act's redistributive feature-the provision of a
tax benefit solely to families with disposable income-raises normative
concerns that would be more fully addressed by the removal of means testing,
and structural gains from inclusion of the ABLE Act in the Internal Revenue
Code may be outweighed by normative losses related to distributive justice.
292Id. at 98.
293Id. at 88.
294 See Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax and Spending Programs, 100 Nw. U. L. REv.
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c. Dignitary Concerns
A third set of concerns raised by the ABLE Act regard the dignity of the
beneficiary with a disability. With the ABLE Act, Congress has, in theory
recognized the needs of individuals with disabilities both to earn a wage and to
receive social supports that will enable integrated living. And yet, the ABLE
account requires a beneficiary to hand her wages over to a manager who will
give them back only upon request. Furthermore, only some of the
beneficiary's expenses will receive the government's imprimatur. Although
this structure was undoubtedly designed to control the ABLE Act's tax
expenditure side, it nonetheless relies on assumptions about disability rather
than starting from the premise that individuals with disabilities are individuals
first.
One example of harm to dignity comes from the need of an account
beneficiary to repeatedly interact with the state with regard to her
expenditures. Repeated interaction with a trustee differs markedly from the
way in which an adult ordinarily would spend money. In addition to creating
transactional costs, it imposes dignitary harm by placing all adults with
qualifying disabilities in a subjugated position when only some need intensive
financial intervention, which could be provided through normal channels like
guardianship or protective trust. In addition, the requirement of repeated
interaction with a trustee may impose financial costs in the form of lost
opportunity. For example, a beneficiary who has limited borrowing power and
limited funds outside of the account may not be able to take advantage of
something like a special one-day sale price on an expensive item because her
interaction with the trustee simply will not be fast enough. In short, forcing
individuals with disabilities into segregated disability-only trust or account
planning subjects them to paternalism on the basis of a characteristic that is
not always determinative of the need for paternalism. A far less intrusive
means of safeguarding access to government-coordinated habilitative care
would be to simply make it available to everyone regardless of income or asset
holding.
A final dignitary concern arising from the ABLE Act stems from law's
function as a repository of social norms. The inclusion of the ABLE Act as a
corollary to section 529, a section of the Internal Revenue Code meant to help
families pay for their children's education, suggests that we view individuals
with waiver-qualifying disabilities as childlike. In fact, adults with significant
disabilities may choose to establish their own ABLE accounts to serve as
repositories for wages earned. Formalization of the longstanding clich6 of the
individual with a developmental disability as childlike imposes a moral cost on
society. It creates a collective relegation of adults of diverse abilities and
backgrounds to a group of people-juveniles-that, by definition, are unable
to adequately navigate the financial responsibilities of adult life. And while
some, or many, adults with qualifying disabilities may not fit comfortably
within the norms established for adulthood by typically-abled society,
2015] 1307
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
formalization of the stereotype of individuals with disabilities as juveniles
grants federal imprimatur to society's collective discomfort with disability
and, in particular, intellectual disability.
VI. REMOVAL OF MEANS TESTING FOR WAIVER SERVICES IS
NORMATIVELY SUPERIOR TO ABLE ACCOUNTS OR ASSET PROTECTION
TRUSTS
The distributional and dignitary concerns raised by asset protection trusts
and ABLE accounts could be eliminated if Congress and the states simply
ended means testing for access to waiver services. Unlike prior solutions that
rely on the participation and funding of private actors, the elimination of
means testing is a public solution available to all. Elimination of means testing
would be a superior solution from a normative standpoint because it would
preserve autonomy, facilitate integration to the fullest extent desired or
possible, remove perverse incentives in family financial planning, and work
around norms of the typically-abled that are embedded in Medicaid eligibility
rules.
A. Normative Considerations Favor Removal of Means Testing
1. Increased Autonomy
Allowing individuals with disabilities to access waiver services regardless
of ability to pay protects autonomy by allowing those individuals to have
control, to the extent that they are able, over their own finances. In contrast, a
legal system that relies solely on the special needs trust and ABLE account
intrudes upon individuals' decision-making and requires them to rely on third
parties for distributions of their own funds.297 Even typical support trusts
(which are currently countable assets for purposes of Medicaid) are less
draconian than special needs trusts because the trustee is, at the very least,
required to make distributions for support and maintenance of the
beneficiary. 298 Unlike the beneficiaries of support trusts, beneficiaries of
special needs trusts may be forced to become claimants of stigmatized
government programs, such as housing and food assistance, which are
297 See Rosenberg, supra note 196, at 108 (describing how a trustee has "complete
discretion to decide when and how to distribute income and principal or to withhold
distributions completely").
29 8 See William H. Lyons & John M. Gradwohl, Discretionary Trusts, Support Trusts,
Discretionary Support Trusts, Spendthrift Trusts, and Special Needs Trusts Under the
Nebraska Uniform Trust Code, 86 NEB. L. REV. 231, 238 (2007) (describing support trusts
and observing that "a support trust would give a trustee discretion to make payments for
the 'support and maintenance' of the beneficiary").
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completely unrelated to disability services.299 In addition, the personal choices
of individuals with disabilities regarding fundamental life decisions, such as
what to eat and where to live, must be made with reference to government
strictures and in some cases will be stalled by government bureaucracy. ABLE
accounts improve this situation somewhat because they lessen the degree to
which waiver recipients must claim social supports unrelated to disability, but
the ABLE Act still has a contribution cap and limits the ways in which
individuals can spend funds.300 Removal of means testing would address these
problems.
2. Less Reliance on Norms of the Able-Bodied
Removal of means testing also reduces government reliance on norms of
the typically-abled that are embedded in the Medicaid eligibility rules. The
practice of denying Medicaid access to individuals with sufficient income
likely arises from the assumption that these individuals are able-bodied enough
for regular employment. Regular employment may signal access to employer-
provided health insurance, or sufficient resources to purchase health insurance
on the private market. In the case of individuals with qualifying disabilities,
one or both of these assumptions are likely to fail. The first assumption-that
an individual with income is able-bodied enough for regular employment-
fails to account for the importance of habilitative services in the continued
employment of individuals with disabilities. To take the analysis a step further,
the rules assume that work is a necessary precondition to income, which may
not be the case. The second assumption-that a person with sufficient
resources can purchase assistance on the private market-is faulty in at least
three ways. First, the income and asset limitations applicable to Medicaid
eligibility are very low, so there is likely a vast raft of individuals who are not
poor enough to qualify for Medicaid but are too poor to purchase disability-
related services outside of Medicaid. Second, it may be difficult for someone
with a qualifying disability to coordinate her own care, whereas a waiver
program generally provides some modicum of central coordination.30 1 Third,
correctness of the assumption depends on the existence of a robust private
299 See Rosenberg, supra note 196, at 108 (describing how a trustee has "complete
discretion to decide when and how to distribute income and principal or to withhold
distributions completely").
300 See supra Part V.A. Nonqualified expenditures of a waiver claimant made with
ABLE account funds will count against Medicaid's income and asset limitations. See
ABLE Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, § 103, 128 Stat. 4056, 4063 (stating that "any
amount (including earnings thereon) in the ABLE account (within the meaning of section
529A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) of such individual, any contributions to the
ABLE account of the individual, and any distribution for qualified disability expenses (as
defined in subsection (e)(5) of such section) shall be disregarded" for the purpose of
determining eligibility for federal benefits).
301 Because the waiver is administered by a state agency, there will be a case worker of
some sort at the very least.
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market, but the relatively small number of individuals with significant
disabilities, in combination with the prevalence of government in the
coordination of and payment for habilitative care, may preclude the
development of such a market. Put more plainly, because governments are so
heavily involved in coordinating care for a relatively small population, it may
be difficult to find nongovernmental providers who work in a coordinated
fashion. If most people seek care through government coordination, the private
market may be hobbled by its use of the government as a middleman. If access
to the private market for care is underdeveloped, access to disability-related
services through Medicaid is crucial (and perhaps allowing an income
insensitive buy-in would lead to increased service capacity and options in
communities). Finally, removal of means testing for access to waiver services
is normatively superior because it prevents assumptions about ability, income,
and access from affecting Medicaid eligibility of individuals with disabilities.
Removal of means testing also addresses the embodiment in Medicaid
eligibility requirements of a false dichotomy between dependent and
independent living. Current law embraces the cultural assumption that adult
financial independence equates to an ability to live independently. It penalizes
individuals with disabilities who have resources by withdrawing needed
disability-related services. But the equation is false. Possession of resources
does not connote an ability to find and privately purchase those disability-
related services needed for community living. 302 In other words, financial need
and dependence upon disability-related services need not be correlated.
Family dependence also creates difficulty for an individual who wishes to
remain Medicaid eligible. The law penalizes in-kind gifts from family
members or friends when they stand in for something that could have been
provided by government assistance.303 In other words, the law punishes adults
with disabilities who enter into relationships of dependency with family and
friends. In contrast, it rewards those who replace dependence on family and
friends with dependence on the government. By placing severe financial
restrictions on access to disability-related services, the government is
unintentionally engaging in financial custodialism. In doing so, it perversely
incentivizes family and friends of an individual with a qualifying disability to
forego financial assistance that could be autonomy-preserving for both the
person providing support and the person receiving it. This, in turn, limits the
life choices of the individual with a disability.
3. Potential for Cost Savings
From a more pragmatic and utilitarian perspective, eliminating means
testing for waiver services also may be cost effective and utility-increasing.
302 Gifts of cash or gifts in kind of items that could have been covered by government
assistance are counted against income limitation.
30 3 Id.
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One source of cost savings may result from increased competitive employment
of individuals with significant disabilities. Susan Stefan has written that while
increasing employment-related services is "cost-intensive at the front end,"
supported employment programs provide a net benefit to taxpayers in the form
of taxes paid by individuals with disabilities beginning in the fourth year of the
program. 304 In addition, integrated living has been linked to better health
outcomes and a reduction in healthcare costs. 305 Additional tax revenue and
healthcare savings could offset some or all of the cost of providing
government-coordinated habilitative care to individuals with significant
disabilities without regard to income.
Another form of savings may arise to the extent that individuals with
disabilities are willing and able to substitute private support for government
support. Consider, one final time, Thomas and his parents. Although they do
not have disposable income for ABLE account contributions, they could leave
a portion of their assets to Thomas through their wills. Let us assume that as an
adult, Thomas has no objection to receiving family support (one can imagine
objections based on dignity and autonomy in some cases). Put more plainly,
both they and he would prefer to avoid public housing, food stamps, and other
interactions with bureaucracy that may be unpleasant and stigmatizing. 306
Because current law continues to rely heavily on trust planning, if Thomas
hopes to preserve his access to government-coordinated habilitative care, he
may be forced to choose government dependence. His choice will impose an
unnecessary cost on taxpayers in the form of food and housing assistance,
even though that assistance is unwanted. With the removal of means testing,
however, Thomas is not forced to make this choice. Instead, he may choose to
receive waiver services and decline other forms of public assistance. This
choice is utility-increasing for Thomas and his family because it satisfies their
preferences. In addition, it prevents the infliction of emotional harm on
Thomas's parents, who otherwise would be forced to disinherit him in his
infancy. Finally, the situation is pragmatically superior because it prevents the
expenditure of scarce government resources on goods and services that are
unwanted by the recipient.
Of course, the extent to which utility is increased and cost is reduced as a
result of voluntary relinquishment of offered benefits depends on the
304 Susan Stefan, Beyond Residential Segregation: The Application of Olmstead to
Segregated Employment Settings, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 875, 933 (2010).
30 5 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Disability Cliff 35 DEMOCRACY J. 55, 66 (2015)
("[E]vidence shows that Medicaid costs decline-by up to $15,000 per person per year-
when individuals with significant disabilities move into competitive work."); Stefan, supra
note 304, at 934-35 (reviewing cost studies and finding support for claim that increased
spending on workplace integration leads to increased tax revenue, better health outcomes,
and fewer welfare claims for individuals with disabilities).
30 6 See Alstott, supra note 228, at 565 ("[S]tigma and social isolation [are] associated
with welfare."); Muller, supra note 228, at 513-14 (stating that direct payments for
disability "tend to be a marker of powerlessness and shame").
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soundness of two assumptions. First, it assumes that individuals with
disabilities are not averse to waiving their entitlement to government
assistance in favor of private support. Second, it assumes that family and
friends of individuals with disabilities are willing and able to provide such
support, but are unable to settle ABLE accounts with disposable income (not
an unfair assumption given the cost of caring for a family member with a
disability). The soundness of these assumptions presents an empirical question
on which no research has yet been done. I hope that this Article will provide a
basis for such future research.
4. Parity Among Families
Finally, provision of waiver services regardless of income or asset holding
is autonomy-maximizing for the families of individuals with disabilities, and it
creates parity for estate planning purposes between these families and families
whose children are all typically-abled. Like most parents, those of a child with
a significant disability want to secure the child's financial future to the greatest
extent possible. The family of a typically-abled child may do this by creating a
college savings account for the child, naming the child as the beneficiary of
retirement accounts or life insurance policies, or leaving a bequest of property,
such as the family home or savings. Families may not do this for a child who
will require government-coordinated habilitative care.307 For example,
consider a family in which one child is typically-abled and another has autism.
If the family hopes to preserve waiver eligibility of the child with autism, it
must treat the two children differently. One will be named in the parents' will,
and the other will be disinherited. Forcing parents to face this moral
dilemma-should they disinherit one child while favoring the other,
particularly when that other is far more likely to need support-imposes an
emotional cost on the parents solely on the basis of a child's disability. In this
situation, parental autonomy is diminished, as is the future autonomy of the
child. The family is forced to push the child's future adult self into stigmatized
public support programs in order to preserve access to waiver services, and
that future adult will exercise no control over spending decisions. If waiver
eligibility were not affected by income and asset holding, however, the
autonomy of the family members and the child would be maximized. The
parents could choose a run-of-the-mill support trust, an outright gift to the
child, or even intestate succession without jeopardizing the child's waiver
access. In this scenario, the family's options for planning with regard to the
typically-abled child and the child with a disability are identical. This, as one
father described to the Senate Finance Committee, "is about fairness." 308 He
added,
307 See supra Part III.C (describing income and asset holding restrictions on Medicaid
eligibility).
308 ABLE Hearing, supra note 180, at 11 (statement of Robert D'Amelio, Volunteer
Advocate, Autism Speaks, Charlotte, NC).
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If Christi and I can use a college savings account to provide for our
[typically-abled] daughter Lindsey's future, why can't we use something
similar to take care of Nicholas and Christopher [who have autism]? I would
love to sleep at night knowing that I was doing everything I could to secure
the future of my children.30 9
Although the ABLE Act has alleviated this concern to some extent for
families with disposable income, ABLE accounts cannot accept testamentary
transfers in excess of the gift-tax exempt amount. 310 As a result, the problem
of family end-of-life planning remains unsolved under current law.
B. Possible Objections to the Removal of Means Testing for Waiver
Services
There are two primary objections to providing broader access to waiver
services. First, some may argue that providing broader access will result in
redistribution toward the wealthy. Evidence suggests, however, that providing
appropriate services would actually reduce government costs through reduced
claims of non-disability-related services and through increased income tax
revenue. 3 11 Second, in a world of limited resources, increased spending on
waiver services for individuals with disabilities may divert resources from
other groups who would derive similar utility from those resources. Stated
more colloquially, why should an individual with a disability whose assets
place him among middle class or wealthy individuals have non-means-tested
access to government-coordinated habilitative care when others do not?
My claim in this paper is not that individuals with disabilities should have
exclusive access to habilitative or vocational services or that their needs are
more important than the needs of other government constituents. Rather, my
claim is narrower. The needs of individuals with disabilities are different from
the needs of other groups, and the distinctive characteristics of significant
disability justify the provision of government-coordinated habilitative care,
regardless of income or asset holding, in the absence of a robust and accessible
market for privately coordinated habilitative care. Alternatively, distributive
concerns could be addressed by an unrestricted form of Medicaid buy-in
applicable to disability-related services. But denying access to government-
30I. at 11-12.
3 10 See ABLE Act of 2014, I.R.C. § 529A(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2015).
311 See supra note 304; see also Bagenstos, supra note 305, at 66 ("[E]vidence shows
that Medicaid costs decline-by up to $15,000 per person per year-when individuals with
significant disabilities move into competitive work."); Stefan, supra note 304, at 934-35
(reviewing cost studies and finding support for claim that increased spending on workplace
integration leads to increased tax revenue, better health outcomes, and fewer welfare
claims for individuals with disabilities).
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coordinated habilitative care entirely on the basis of income, which is not an
indicator of disability, makes no sense.
312
Horizontal, equity-based objections to non-means-tested waiver services
are only valid to the extent that two claimants are similarly situated, and
whether this is the case may depend upon the characteristics that one chooses
to compare. The argument that an individual with a disability and a typically-
abled individual with equal asset holdings are similarly situated is a straw
man. Income and asset ownership are not the only relevant comparators for
purposes of assessing equity. To demonstrate how thoroughly the horizontal
equity argument fails, consider two individuals whose situations-housing,
employment, etc.-are identical in every way except that Individual A has
autism. Would Individual B be indifferent to assuming the life of Individual
A? Clearly not. Because our society is so thoroughly oriented toward the
typically-abled, Individual B would be left worse off as a result of the trade,
even if his income and asset holdings did not change because of it. In other
words, A and B are not similarly situated after all.
Furthermore, income and asset holdings are largely unmoored from an
individual's actual need for services. There is statistical support for the
assertion that disability has a profound effect on individuals who live with it,
regardless of socioeconomic status.313 Adults with intellectual or
developmental disabilities are almost three and a half times more likely than
those without such disabilities to need help or supervision with one or more
activities of daily living, such as bathing, dressing, eating, using a toilet, and
getting in and out of bed.314 In addition, "[a]fter controlling for gender, age,
health status, race, and economic status, adults with disabilities were
significantly less likely to be in the labor market than those without
disabilities." 315 Nearly 40% of individuals with intellectual or developmental
disabilities have functional limitations in language compared to 0.2% of
people without them.316 Over 61% of individuals with intellectual or
developmental disabilities have functional limitations with self-direction (i.e.,
are able to do daily activities without prompting) compared to 1% of people
without them. 317 And 88% of individuals with intellectual or developmental
disabilities have functional limitations with regard to economic self-
sufficiency compared to 1.7% of people without them.318 Unlike their
3 12 See Larson et al., supra note 6, at 5 (comparing functional limitations in the
disability versus nondisability community).
313 Id.
3 14 Sheryl Larson et al., Service Use by and Needs of Adults with Functional
Limitations or ID/DD in the NHIS-D: Diference by Age, Gender, and Disability, DD
DATA BRIEF (Research & Training Ctr. on Cmty. Living & Inst. on Cmty. Integration
(UCEDD), Minneapolis, Minn.), Dec. 2003, at 5.
3 15 Id. at 3.




MAKING THE LAW MORE ABLE
typically-developed counterparts, individuals with significant disabilities may
need adaptive tools such as wheelchairs, motorized scooters, home
modifications for accessibility, picture communication software, and
communication board devices. 319 These needs present a unique set of
challenges that present themselves across socioeconomic lines.320 As a result,
a horizontal equity argument against non-means-tested provision of waiver
services must fail: there simply is no similarly situated comparator.
A second argument against non-means-tested provision of waiver
services-that it will redistribute public resources to middleclass and wealthy
families that do not need them-fails on pragmatic grounds for two reasons.
First, comparable services are available on the private market only to people
with substantial disposable income,321 and second, it is likely that most
middle-class and wealthy families already have secured Medicaid eligibility
for their loved one through financial planning and are accessing not only
Medicaid but also other social safety net programs. For these families, reform
does not increase access. Instead, it increases autonomy and may decrease
overall government dependency. The following paragraphs address each point
in turn.
Unless an individual with a disability (or, more likely, that individual's
family) is very wealthy, there may be no reasonable private market corollary
to government-coordinated waiver services in many parts of the county. There
are at least two reasons why equivalent private services may be scarce. First,
private care is not affordable to families of average means, 322 and most private
health insurance plans do not cover habilitative care. 323 Second, waiver
services may be coordinated by a case manager, which is typically not the case
for care purchased on the private market. For an individual with an intellectual
or developmental disability, coordination may be an important aspect of
waiver services. A case manager assesses an individual's needs, develops a
plan for meeting those needs, coordinates care among multiple providers, links
individuals with disabilities to other relevant federal and state programs,
monitors the delivery of care and addresses problems with it, and responds to
3192010 FINDS SURVEY, supra note 86, at 18-19.
320 See generally Larson et al., supra note 314 (comparing need for and use of
habilitative services across age, gender, race, and socioeconomic status).
321 MEDICAID PRIMER, supra note 7, at 10 (reporting that individuals with disabilities
often are unable to obtain adequate coverage on the private market, and Medicaid allows
them to access and pay for services needed for community living and employment).
322 THE ARC, supra note 4, at 8 (finding that eighty percent of families report that they
do not have enough money to pay for care that their family member with a disability
needs); MEDICAID PRIMER, supra note 7, at 10 (reporting that individuals with disabilities
are unable to obtain adequate private coverage and require Medicaid to access and afford
habilitative care).
323 See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 27 ("[P]rivate insurance-on which most
nondisabled people rely for their health needs-fails to cover the services people with
disabilities most need for independence and health.").
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crisis situations. 324 For an individual with multiple care providers who address
various aspects of daily living or employment, coordination by a third party
expert may be essential to effective delivery of habilitative services. Notably,
the needs for habilitative services and coordination of care do not decrease as a
person's income and asset holdings increase. As a result, it makes little sense
to restrict access to government-coordinated habilitative care on the basis of
income or asset holdings.
Limiting government coordination and payment for waiver services to the
very poor also cannot be justified on the basis that broader access will unduly
burden taxpayers. First, access to government-coordinated habilitative care
should be permissible as a matter of distributive justice, although as Ruth
Colker has noted, this area is undertheorized.325 Second, the cost of offering
waiver services to individuals who previously failed to meet the income and
asset limitations may be offset by gains in other parts of the social safety net.
Removal of means testing for waiver services would eliminate perverse
incentives that cause family and friends of individuals with qualifying
disabilities to withdraw support and that cause individuals with disabilities to
refrain from full employment for fair pay.326 Providing broader access to
waiver services in favor of individuals with significant disabilities may
increase support from family and friends and may increase employment. 327
Increased support and employment may, in turn, reduce the number of
claimants for nonwaiver benefits such as housing and food assistance. Finally,
studies have indicated that increased employment-related services have the
potential to both increase tax revenue and decrease healthcare costs. 328 The
interrelationship of these moving parts is complicated. Consequently, I do not
argue without qualification that the removal of means testing would be cost
neutral or cost saving. I do, however, take the position that it is not obviously
cost increasing and that further study is warranted.
Finally, arguments that focus on the injustice of redistribution in the form
of waiver services to middle-class or wealthy individuals with disabilities
assume that broader access will result in increased claims from the middleclass
and wealthy. It is more likely, however, that given the importance of waiver
services to quality of life, individuals with disabilities who have means (or
whose families have means) are almost uniformly eligible for waiver services
324 HCBS INSTRUCTIONS, supra, note 262, at 113-14.
325 Colker, supra note 26, at 1415. I do not attempt, in this paper, to fill the gap.
326 For examples of the effect of these perverse incentives, see ABLE Hearing, supra
note 180, at 34 (prepared statement of Sara C. Wolff, Self-Advocate & Board Member,
National Down Syndrome Society (NDSS)) (describing arrangements with employers to
minimize work hours in order to protect Medicaid eligibility); id. at 30-31 (prepared
statement of Chase A. Phillips, Financial Advisor and Advocate) (describing adverse
financial planning results).327 See generally id.328 See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
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as a result of trust planning or other financial planning. 329 The issue for these
families is not a lack of access, but rather the financial, emotional, and
dignitary costs of that access. Finally, as mentioned above, broadening access
to waiver services does not necessarily require costless provision of those
services. The government could simultaneously ensure access and address
redistributive concerns by permitting individuals with significant disabilities to
buy into the Medicaid waiver regardless of their employment status.
In summary, arguments against the removal of means testing on the basis
of opposition to redistribution do not rest on solid ground in this context
because the needs of individuals with disabilities are distinctive. In addition, it
is not clear that the removal of means testing would result in a drain on
resources. By reducing the demand for other social safety net support and
increasing the potential for wage-earning work, elimination of means testing
may even result in savings.
VII. CONCLUSION
Medicaid eligibility is crucially important for people with qualifying
disabilities because it provides nearly exclusive access to habilitative care that
improves quality of life, facilitates independent living (if possible and desired),
and preserves dignity. Means testing, through the imposition of income and
asset limitations on eligibility, limits access to these necessary services. Means
testing fails on normative grounds because it does not recognize the private
market's failure to provide affordable services and coordination among service
providers. In addition, there is no relationship between an individual's
financial outlook and that individual's need for coordinated habilitative care.
As a result, placing income and asset holding limitations on the provision of
care denies free and equal access to community living to individuals with
significant disabilities who are too far above the federal poverty line to claim
Medicaid and too far below the level of income or wealth needed to pay the
market price for care. Means testing thus creates perverse incentives for
individuals with disabilities to limit their hours of employment and their
wages, which in turn, may limit their employability. The law also perversely
incentivizes families and friends of individuals with disabilities to withdraw
support, and in doing so, it interferes with natural relationships of dependency
while simultaneously guaranteeing an increase in claims for other public
benefits such as housing and food assistance.
Attempts to alleviate the adverse impact of Medicaid eligibility rules on
individuals with disabilities, such as the creation of special needs trusts,
Medicaid buy-in programs, and ABLE accounts, are unquestionably
improvements in access to integrated living, but they continue to restrict
autonomy and impose their own dignitary, emotional, and financial costs. In
329 Once again, it is worth noting that there has been no empirical research to support
this assumption.
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addition, they are impartial solutions because they rely on private actors and
funds for their implementation. A public solution is needed. Providing non-
means-tested access to government-coordinated habilitative care is a
normatively superior solution. It recognizes the uniqueness of individuals with
disabilities, allowing them and their families to autonomously create an
appropriate and individually tailored financial support structure without
jeopardizing access to care that is necessary for quality of life and integration
into the broader community and workplace.
